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I. In tro d u ctio n
In 1983, Congress adopted the Orphan Drug Act (the "Act") 
pursuant to its power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce 
to stimulate research and development of drugs useful in treating 
relatively rare diseases.1 The cost of drug research and complying 
with the complex requirements for securing governmental 
approval to market drugs left many illnesses "orphans."2 "Ratio-
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1. O rphan  D rug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 S ta t. 2049 (1983) (codified as am ended 
a t  21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-360ee (1988)). The legislative h istory  of th e  Act is thoroughly 
traced  in  David M. Richardson, The Orphan Drug Tax Credit: A n  Inadequate Response 
to an Ill-Defined Problem, 6 Am. J .  TAX PoL’Y 135, 138-68 (1987).
2. The process for securing m arketing  approval for new  drugs in  th e  U nited  S ta tes 
is complex and  expensive. After engaging in  research  to  develop a  new  drug, a  d rug 
m anufactu rer m u st th en  engage in  pharmacological and  toxicological investigations to 
determ ine th e  drug's characteristics. N ext, Food and  D rug A dm inistration ("FDA") 
approval for clinical testing  m u st be secured through th e  process of applying for an  
Investigational New D rug exemption from th e  Food D rug and  Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355 (1988), a  procedure designed to  insure th a t  th e  h ea lth  and  safety of hum an 
subjects in  th e  clinical testing  are  protected. T hree phases to  th e  clinical tr ia ls  m ust 
usually  be followed. P hase 1 serves to  develop d a ta  on side effects and  relative effec­
tiveness; P hase  2  is designed to  evaluate th e  effectiveness of th e  drug for a  p a rticu la r 
disease o r condition; and P hase  3 is designed to  establish  safety and  effectiveness 
inform ation in  order to  m ake an  overall risk-benefit judgm ent concerning th e  drug  and 
to  provide labelling inform ation. The en tire  process m ay tak e  several years and  cost 
m illions of dollars. See Li-Hsien Rin-Laures & D iane Janofsky, Recent Developments 
Concerning the Orphan Drug Act, 4 HARV. J.L . & TECH. 269, 271-72 (1991); C ynthia A. 
Thomas, Re-Assessing the Orphan Drug Act, 23 COLUM. J.L . & Soc. P ro b s . 413, 420-21 
(1990) ("It p resen tly  takes approxim ately te n  years and an  average of $97 m illion to 
develop and  m ark e t a  drug.")
The accuracy of estim ates of th e  average to ta l cost from research  and  discovery 
to  FDA approval is questionable because of widely varying estim ates and  th e  growing 
practice of expediting th e  drug approval process for drugs useful in  trea tin g  term inal or 
chronic illnesses. Expedited approval processes have been used in  th e  case of O rphan 
Drugs. In  th e  past, th e  process for gaining approval w as long and  expensive. One study
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nally maximizing" drug manufacturers did not care about the 
illness from a research and marketing viewpoint because of the 
lack of sufficient economic incentives to engage in research and. 
undertake the governmental approval process for marketing safe 
and effective drugs to treat "orphaned" diseases.3 Between ten 
and twenty million Americans suffer from one of approximately
5,000 rare diseases and could benefit from research, development, 
and marketing of drugs useful in treating rare diseases.4 Congress 
chose to remedy the twin problems of inducing research into drugs 
having a relatively thin market potential and overcoming the costs 
of securing Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval for 
marketing the drug through the Orphan Drug Act by providing 
drug researchers and manufacturers a series of incentives, 
including: (1) federal funding of grants and contracts for clinical 
testing of Orphan treatments;5 (2) a tax credit of 50% of the costs 
of clinical testing;6 (3) the creation of the Orphan Product Board
for 1967, showed P hase 1 clinical studies lasted  an  average of 9.1 m onths a t  a n  average 
cost of $166,000 in  1967 dollars; Phase 2 studies lasted  an  average of 23.2 m onths a t  an  
average cost of $881,000 in  1967 dollars; and  P hase 3 studies lasted  an  average of 33.6 
m onths a t  an  average cost of $1,546,000 in  1967 dollars. See Ronald L. Desrosiers, Note, 
The Drug Patent Term: Longtime Battleground in the Control o f Health Care Costs, 24 
N ew  E ng. l .  R ev. 115,121 (1989).
3. I t  h as  been pointed out th a t  th e  Act
addressed an  un in tended  and  undesirable effect of th is  country's d rug 
approval process—th e  lack of economic incentives for developing drugs 
sorely needed by those afflicted w ith  ra re  diseases. The price we as a  nation  
pay for a  quality  drug approval system  th a t  only perm its m arketing  of de­
m onstrably safe and  effective drugs is extraordinarily  high developm ental 
costs. W hen developmental costs cannot be recovered and  profits are 
unlikely, drugs a re  not developed.
P atric ia  J . Kenney, The Orphan Drug Act—Is it a Barrier to Innovation? Does I t Create 
Unintended Windfalls?, 43 FOOD DRUG COSM. L .J. 667, 667 (1988).
4. U .S. D ep’t  o f  H e a l t h  a n d  H u m an  S e rv ic e s ,  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  
C om m ission  o n  O rp h a n  D is e a s e s  xiii (1989) [hereinafter R e p o r t] .
5. 21 U.S.C. § 360ee provides th e  following authority:
(a) A uthority of Secretary
The Secretary m ay m ake g ran ts  to  and en te r into contracts w ith  
public and  private en tities and  individuals to  assist in  (1) defraying the  
costs of qualified tes tin g  expenses incurred in  connection w ith th e  de­
velopm ent of drugs for ra re  diseases and conditions, (2) defraying th e  costs 
of developing medical devices for ra re  diseases or conditions, and  (3) 
defraying th e  costs of developing m edical foods for ra re  diseases or 
conditions.
21 U.S.C. § 360ee (1988). Subsection (c) appropriates $10 million for 1988, $12 m illion 
for 1989 and  $14 m illion for 1990 to  support g ran ts  and contracts authorized u n d er 
subsection (a). Id. § 360ee(l).
6. 26 U.S.C. § 28 (1988); see also 26 C.F.R. § 602 (1991).
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to coordinate and facilitate the development of orphan drugs;7 and 
(4) the grant of an exclusive right to market an orphan drug for 
seven years to the first applicant receiving FDA marketing 
approval of the drug for the designated orphan disease.8
Originally, Congress limited the availability of the Act to 
drugs for diseases where there was "no reasonable expectation 
that the cost of developing and making available" the drug in the 
United States could be recovered from sales in the United States.9 
This standard soon proved unworkable because it necessitated 
complex proof that the drug would in fact be unprofitable. 
Congress responded in 1984 by defining "rare diseases" as those 
with patient populations of less than 200,000 in the United States; 
in cases where the patient population may exceed 200,000, Orphan 
Drug status may be gained where one can prove that a drug is not 
expected to cover the costs of bringing it to market.10 While
7. 42 U.S.C. § 236 (1988).
8. 21 U.S.C, § 360cc (1988). This section provides th a t  th e  Secretary m ay no t approve 
ano ther application or issue a  certificate o r license for "such drug  for such disease or 
condition . . . u n til th e  expiration of seven years from th e  date of th e  approval of th e  
approved application, th e  issuance of th e  certification, or th e  issuance of th e  license." Id.
This section of th e  Act also enum erates two instances in  which th e  Secretary m ay 
issue certificates or licenses to  others. The firs t is w here "the holder of th e  approved 
application, of such certification, or of th e  license cannot assure availability of sufficient 
quantities of th e  drug  to  m eet th e  needs of persons w ith  th e  disease or condition for 
which th e  drug  was designated." The second is w here th e  holder of th e  certification or 
license consents in  w riting  to  th e  certification or licensing of o ther applicants. Id.
Proposed O rphan D rug Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 3338 (1991) (to be codified a t  21 
C.F.R. § 316) (proposed Jan u a ry  29,1991), em phasizes th e  exclusive n a tu re  of th e  g ran t 
by providing:
FDA in terp re ts  th e  act to  accord exclusive approval only to  th e  firs t 
d rug approved. This in terp retation  m eans th a t  o ther applicants, who m ay 
have invested substan tia l money and effort in  supporting th e ir  applications, 
a re  barred  from m arketing  for th e  7 year period of exclusivity even though 
th ey  filed before or shortly  afte r th e  applicant whose product w as ap ­
proved.........
FDA is required  by law  to re ject th e  concept of jo in t o r shared  
exclusivity (unless i t  is agreed to  by all sponsors of a  particu la r drug).
Id. a t  3341.
9. 50 Fed. Reg. 19,583 (1985); see also Thomas, supra note 2, a t  416.
10. 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(2) (1988). Subsection (2) of th a t  section provides in  its  entirety:
(2) For purposes of parag raph  (1), the  te rm  "rare d isease or 
condition" m eans any disease or condition which (A) affects less th a n
200,000 persons in  th e  U nited  S tates, or (B) affects more th a n  200,000 in  
th e  U nited S ta tes and  for which th ere  is no reasonable expectation th a t  the  
cost of developing and  m aking available in  th e  U nited  S ta tes a  drug  for 
such disease or condition will be recovered from sales in  th e  U nited  S tates 
of such drug. D eterm inations u n d er th e  preceding sentence w ith  respect to
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removing the source of ambiguity concerning the definition of an 
"Orphan Drug,”11 the amendment created other ambiguities. For 
example, where the drug is useful in a patient population under 
200,000, Orphan Drug status is fixed at the time of designation 
and is not reviewed thereafter.12 Consequently, a particular 
illness like AIDS may meet the objective numerical test at the 
time of designation for Orphan Drug exclusivity, but then rapidly 
outgrow the numerical test during the seven year period of market 
exclusivity and be highly profitable as a result.13
Amendments passed by Congress in 1990,14 and pocket 
vetoed by President Bush, would have caused exclusivity to be 
revoked where the patient population exceeded 200,000 during the 
seven-year term and provided for shared exclusivity where the 
drug appeared profitable from the beginning. In a "Memorandum 
of Disapproval" explaining the pocket veto, Bush stated that 
revoking the status would weaken market incentives created by 
the Act by sending "a troublesome signal" to developers of Orphan 
Drugs by retroactively changing the rules "for firms that made 
investment decisions based on the expectation of 7 years of market
any drug shall be m ade on the  basis of th e  facts and circum stances as of 
th e  date th e  request for designation of th e  drug under th is  subsection is 
made.
I d
11. I t  should be noted th a t  m any illnesses m ost people consider common have th e  
po tential to  be classified as orphan diseases dependent upon how narrow  th e  classifica­
tions are drawn. I t  h as  been s ta ted  th a t  "the O rphan D rug Act classifies as orphan 
diseases such ailm ents as asthm a, anorexia, AIDS, colitis, glaucoma, h e a rt disease, 
hemophilia, hepatitis, liver disorders, chronic pain, lead poisoning, tuberculosis, leukem ia 
and m ost forms of cancer, including cancer of th e  bladder, b rain , cervix, esophagus, head  
and neck, lung, lymphoma, ovary, and pancreas." Jam es R. Love, TAXPAYER ASSETS 
P r o j e c t ,  W o rk in g  P a p e r  N o . 6, T h e  O rp h a n  D ru g  A c t  a n d  G o v e rn m e n t  S p o n s o re d  
M o n o p o lie s  f o r  M a r k e t in g  P h a r m a c e u t i c a l  D r u g s  (January  1992).
12. The final sentence of § 360bb expressly provides th a t  th e  facts and  circum stances 
"as of th e  date th e  req u est for designation . . .  is made" shall govern th e  determ ination 
of w hether th e  drug qualifies as an  O rphan Drug. 21 U.S.C. § 360bb (1988). In  its 
pending ru le  m aking, th e  FDA rejects th e  notion of jo in t licensing for sim ultaneous 
filings and  th e  notion th a t  competing applicants are entitled  to  a hearing before a  license 
or certificate is issued. Only one applicant can be gran ted  a  license or certificate, absent 
th e  consent of certificate holder. 56 Fed. Reg. 3338, 3341 (1991) (to be codified a t  21 
C.F.R. § 316) (proposed Jan . 29, 1991).
13. See Thomas, supra note 2, a t  431-32. A t th e  tim e th e  drug AZT w as designated 
an  O rphan Drug, it w as estim ated th a t  th e  p a tien t population w as 45,000. In  1989, the  
estim ated p a tien t population w as 600,000. I d
14. 136 Cong. Rec . H5799 (daily ed. Ju ly  30, 1990).
HeinOnline -- 1992 Utah L. Rev. 392 1992
No. 2] ORPHAN DRUG ACT 393
exclusivity."15 It has been appropriately pointed out that this 
rationale "exaggerates" the impact of revoking the designation 
where the population exceeds 200,000 because few orphan diseases 
will grow beyond a patient population of 200,000 and the drug 
may still retain exclusivity where it can be shown to be unprofit­
able.16
A particular drug may meet more than the needs of the 
patient population for which it is a designated Orphan Drug and 
have significant sales for other and more widespread illnesses. 
While the FDA designates the drug for a particular illness and the 
holder of the designation may not openly promote its use for other 
illnesses, doctors may prescribe it for other illnesses where it is 
found useful.17 Market exclusivity for the holder of the Orphan 
Drug designation in such circumstances may give it an exclusive 
market over a broader range of illnesses than just those for the 
designated orphan illness.18
A further ambiguity is caused by the . manner in which a 
particular illness is classified as an orphan disease. In what one 
witness before recent Congressional hearings called "salami 
slicing,"19 separate applications for orphan disease status can be 
divided up into narrow classifications and subclassifications of the 
same generic disease. For example, the various forms and 
locations of cancer are treated as separate diseases, so that a 
disease like ovarian cancer can be distinguished from other forms 
of cancer for purposes of the Act because it has an estimated 
population of 160,OOO.20 It has even been possible to have the 
same drug independently designated an Orphan Drug for several 
discrete illnesses no one of which exceeds the 200,000 patient 
population but which gives exclusivity over sales of the drug for a
15. 137 CONG. REC. H73-74 (daily ed. Jan . 3, 1991).
16. R in-Laures & Janofsky, supra note 2, a t  280-81.
17. Thomas, supra  note 2, a t 429-30; Rin-Laures & Janofsky, supra  no te 2, a t  281-82.
18. An often cited instance of th is  practice is th e  drug Epogen, given orphan  s ta tu s  
for end-stage renal disease and  chronic kidney failure. Epogen is  an  artificial form of 
erythropoietin, o r EPO, a  protein m anufactured  by  th e  kidneys to  stim ulate red  blood cell 
production. I t  has uses beyond th e  trea tm en t of ren al failure, and  o ther companies a re  
seeking approval of its  sale for o ther end uses. See Thomas, supra  no te 2, a t  430-31. The 
hum an  growth hormone, hGH, w as designated for trea tin g  hypopituitary dwarfism , b u t 
h as  now been found to  be useful in  trea tin g  o ther growth horm one disorders and  aging 
in  m en. R in-Laures & Janofsky, supra note 2, a t  281.
19. Love, supra note 11, a t  6.
20. Id.
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combined patient population in excess of 200,000.21 While the 
letter of the law may be obeyed by such tactics, its spirit is cer­
tainly abused.22
Finally, the measurement of less than a 200,000 patient 
population is expressly limited to a patient population in the 
United States and does not take account of potential foreign sales 
of the drug where a particular affliction may affect millions and 
generate highly profitable sales. One study concluded that thirty- 
six drugs eligible for orphan status at the time of the adoption of 
the Act had foreign markets of over one million patients.23 While 
FDA action designating a drug as an orphan drug is limited to 
domestic sales, the designation may carry with it effective control 
over foreign sales as well by providing monopolized domestic 
market support for foreign sales.
In 1985 Congress further amended the Act by expanding its 
application to patented as well as non-patented drugs and 
extended the scope of the application of the Act to antibiotics and 
biologies intended for treating rare diseases.24 The extension of 
the Act to patented drugs was believed necessary because the long 
approval process for many drugs meant that several years of 
patent protection may be lost before a patented drug may be mar­
keted and many of the drugs having application to rare diseases 
were near the end of their patent term when a rare disease
21. Biogin, Inc. h as  been notably successful w ith  "salam i slicing." I t  is reported:
In  February  1991, FDA gran ted  the  firm  orphan drug s ta tu s  for its  d rug r- 
IFN -beta to  be used in  th e  trea tm en t of m etasta tic  ren a l cell carcinoma. In  
April, th e  firm  received orphan drug designation for th e  sam e drug in  th e  
trea tm en t of cutaneous m alignan t m elanom a. F ifteen days later, r-IFN -beta 
earned  orphan drug designation for th e  trea tm en t of cutaneous T-cell 
lymphoma. T hen i t  received designation for AID S-related Kaposi’s sarcom a 
and  m ultiple sclerosis. The combined p a tien t population exceeds th e
200,000 threshold  several tim es.
Suzanne T regarthen, Prescription To Stop Drug Companies’ Profiteering, WALL ST. J .,  
M arch 5, 1992, a t  A13.
22. O ther complexities abound. For example, i t  is possible for th e  FDA to g ran t 
O rphan D rug s ta tu s  on a  paten ted  drug to  a party  o ther th a n  the  p a ten t holder. An 
exclusive m arketing  rig h t m ay be gran ted  to  an  applicant tak ing  advantage of 
governm ent research  or governm ent sponsored research, thereby  resu lting  in  th e  public 
paying both for th e  research  producing th e  drug and  the  monopoly pricing for th e  drug 
which m ay be charged by th e  holder of th e  O rphan D rug designation.
23. Thomas, supra  note 2, a t  429.
24. O rphan D rug Am endm ents of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-91, 99 S ta t. 387 (1985) 
(am ending 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1988)).
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application was discovered or applied for.25 The 1985 amendment 
allows a form of "tacking" to take place by adding seven years of 
marketing exclusivity to the life of an about-to-expire patent, even 
though there has not been any additional disclosure of a new 
invention. The seven year period of Orphan Drug exclusivity runs 
from the time of FDA approval for marketing, unlike the seven­
teen year period of exclusivity for a patent which runs from the 
date of issue of the patent and not the date of FDA approval for 
marketing the patented drug.26 Pharmaceutical manufacturers 
cite the grant of seven years marketing exclusivity as the most 
important incentive to Orphan Drug research and development27 
and it has been recommended by the National Commission on 
Orphan Diseases that the seven year period of exclusivity be incr­
eased.28
Measured superficially in terms of the total number of new 
drug applications for rare or orphan diseases, the Act has been a 
success. It has been estimated that prior to the adoption of the 
Act, only ten drugs meeting the Act’s standards had been approved 
by the FDA.29 In the first seven years of the Act’s life, 45 orphan 
drugs had been approved and 133 were undergoing clinical 
trials.30 Even though the developer of a drug is not assured of 
gaining Orphan Drug status over competing applicants, the 
prospect of having the exclusive right to market the drug for seven 
years has often stimulated competition.31
25. Orphan Drug Amendments o f1985, Hearings Before House Comm, on Energy and  
Commerce, 99th  Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. REP. No. 99-153 (1985); see also Thomas, 
supra  note 2, a t  426.
26. This problem  m ay have been rem edied by  th e  D rug Price Com petition and  P a ten t 
Term  R estoration Act of 1984, 21 U.S.C § 301 (1988). B ut see P a tti, Section 202 o f the 
Drug Price Competition andPatent Term Restoration Act—Has Congress Acted Constitu­
tionally, J .  PAT. OFF. & TRADEMARK SOCY 567 (1987) (arguing th e  fa ilu re of th e  Act to 
g ran t absolute "exclusivity" to  inventors violates th e  constitutional requirem ent th a t  
inventors be given th e  "exclusive" rig h t to  th e ir  invention). For an  excellent review  of th e  
issue of th e  appropriate length of th e  "limited times" which should or should no t be 
available for p a ten ts  on drugs see Desrosiers, supra note 2. For a  h a rsh  criticism  of th e  
Act, see M ezrich, The Patentability and Patent Term Extension 6 f Lifesaving Drugs: A  
Deadly Mistake, 74 J .  PAT. OFF. & TRADEMARK SOC’Y 77 (1992).
27. REPORT, supra  note 4 , a t  58.
28. I d
29. R in-Laures & Janofsky, supra note 2, a t  270.
30. Id.
31. Kenney, supra  note 3, a t  675-77 (reviewing com petition betw een five companies 
to  secure an  O rphan  D rug designation for H um an  Growth Hormone (hGH)).
HeinOnline -- 1992 Utah L. Rev. 395 1992
396 UTAH LAW REVIEW [1992:389
One can not know, short of a case-by-case examination of the 
confidential applications, the degree to which their gross number 
reflects a truly significant rise in research and development of 
drugs which would not otherwise have been produced save for the 
existence of the exclusivity incentive on top of the other generous 
incentives. The exclusivity conferred by the Act is a rare form of 
exclusivity: it is absolute, government enforced, protects against 
both actual and potential competition, and is not accompanied by 
rate regulation. Practices like "salami slicing", having the same 
drug applied to several different illnesses, exploiting research by 
government scientists or government grants, and obtaining 
Orphan Drug status for diseases likely to expand beyond a
200,000 patient population or which can meet the needs of large 
numbers in other countries, signal that profit maximizing 
opportunism is taking place rather than solemn and altruistic 
commitments by private drug manufacturers to the humanitarian 
goals of the Act.
In addition, the likelihood of monopoly profits from exclusive 
marketing rights for Orphan Drugs may well be distorting the 
rational allocation of research and development resources in the 
general drug research market is a real probability but cannot be 
accounted for in gross measures of the number of Orphan Drug 
Act applications. Stated harshly and perhaps unfairly, the gross 
number of Orphan Drug approvals and applications, when viewed 
in light of the other subsidies provided in addition to market 
exclusivity, does little more than confirm the generalization that 
profit maximization (greed) most likely drives private investment 
decisions to do research for Orphan Drugs. It does not justify the 
conclusion that but for market exclusivity, rather than other forms 
of incentives, we would not have seen the marked upswing in the 
number of Orphan Drugs being brought to market.
Not surprisingly, there has been significant controversy 
concerning claims that the lure of seven years of market exclusivi­
ty is generating abuses of the Act and its purpose. For example, 
it appears that some applications for Orphan Drug status have 
been intentionally drafted to meet the 200,000 patient population 
even though the drug can serve a far wider range of patients.32 
The resulting seven years of exclusivity means that far greater
32. See R in-Laures & Janofsky, supra  note 2, a t  288-89.
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sales are being made than just those sales for the claimed orphan 
drug patient population and the profitability of the drug is far 
greater than was originally represented in the application for 
Orphan Drug status.
Congressional critics of the Act have reported that the prices 
charged for some orphan drugs are so high that they are effective­
ly denied to orphan disease suffers and that monopoly pricing is 
contributing to the escalation of health care costs and the costs of 
public welfare and other insurance systems paying for the 
drugs.33 For example, Congressman Studds has cited the case of 
the Orphan Drug "Ceredase," a drug used to treat suffers of 
Gauchers disease—a rare inherited disorder which deprives its 
victims of an enzyme which normally dissolves certain fatty 
material in the body.34 Victims of the illness suffer great pain 
and die in early middle age. Ceredase replaces the missing enzyme 
and, although not a cure for the disease, patients taking the drug
33. Excessive profits are the most visible adverse effect of monopolies, but not the 
most significant long term effects of an exclusive monopoly. The adverse effects on 
innovation and efficiency for both research on the particular orphan disease and the 
production of the drug designated for its treatment are more important consequences of 
the grant of exclusivity. Once a market is fenced off, particularly by the government 
grant of an exclusive and unregulated monopoly, the incentives for further research and 
cbst savings in producing the product for the fenced off market are eliminated. The 
progress of science and the useful arts gained by public disclosure of new discoveries is 
thought to justify fencing off the market for truly new inventions because they add to the 
store of human knowledge and stimulate further research based upon the disclosure of 
the new idea. But where there is no disclosure of a truly new invention, fencing off a 
market from competition only serves to deny society the benefits of further research and 
innovation by competitors seeking to serve the fenced off market. Where the market is 
closed, why should competitors and the monopolist invest in research, production, and 
other forms of innovation?
Paradoxically, the choice to stimulate innovation in the treatment of orphan . 
diseases by the creation of seven years of marketing exclusivity may well be leading to 
the opposite long term effect, along with monopoly pricing exploiting the victims of rare 
diseases. As Professor Michael Porter has observed:
It is well established in economics that progressiveness or innovativeness 
is by far the most important source of economic growth and welfare, greatly 
out-weighing pricq/cost margins (allocative efficiency) or even static 
efficiency. The central focus of antitrust policy, in my view, ought to be on 
fostering progressiveness, defined broadly to include not only technological 
innovation by new ways of competing in product, marketing, service, and 
so on. When faced with tradeoffs, we should weigh pro'gressiveness much 
higher than static efficiency or a snapshot of price-cost margins.
Innovation, Rivalry and Competitive Advantage: Interview with Professor Michael E. 
Porter, ANTITRUST, Spring 1991, Vol. 5, No. 2, at 5.
34. 137 CONG. REC. E2435 (June 27, 1991).
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are considerably improved even though they must take treatments 
every two weeks -for the remainder of their lives. The present 
average annual price for treatment is approximately $200,000,35 
a price victims cannot long pay and one their insurance program 
may not cover or will not sustain beyond the maximum limit of 
their policy.36 While it is not clear whether the high price for the 
drug is attributable to development and production costs or 
whether it is due to monopoly pricing by the manufacturer holding 
the Orphan Drug designation, or both, it is clear that the objective 
of stimulating development of drug treatments for rare disorders 
or illnesses is not worth much to those who cannot afford to pay 
the price.
Marketing exclusivity for a seven year period has meant the 
discretion to engage in monopoly pricing resulting in profits far in 
excess of research and FDA approval costs.37 Frequently cited
35. This is a conservative estimate. In hearings on The Orphan Drug Act 
Amendments of 1991, a bill introduced by Senators Kassebaum and Metzenbaum ending 
exclusivity status when sales of an orphan drugreach $200 million, testimony concerning 
"Ceredase" was said to cost one patient $340,000 per year. Orphan Drug Act Amend­
ments o f 1991, Hearings on S. 2060 before the Labor and Human Resources Comm., I02d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (March 3, 1992) (not yet available). Testimony by Genzyme Corp., 
manufacturer of "Ceredase," suggested that the high cost of the drug lasts only for the 
first several months of intensive drug therapy and that the patient cost would be 
subsequently reduced when intensive therapy ends and a lower level of drug would then 
be administered. Witnesses Outline Current Abuses o f Orphan Drug Act, Call for 
Changes, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), at A10 (Jan. 22, 1992).
36. The common lifetime limit on insurance coverage is $1,000,000 for those who 
have insurance coverage. 137 CONG. REC. E2435 (daily ed. June 27,1991).
37. In the model of a pure competitive market, price is driven to marginal cost. 
While no market meets all the requirements for a purely competitive market, it is 
generally the case that competition causes price to be more or less linked to and gov­
erned by cost. In those industries characterized by natural monopoly and rate regulation, 
the entire exercise of rate regulation is driven toward linking "just and reasonable" rates 
to the cost of providing the service, including a reasonable return on investment. This 
does not appear to be the case with regard to the pricing of Orphan Drugs insulated from 
price competition for a seven year period and not presently rate regulated, lik e  any 
monopolist free to price a product above cost, the monopoly firm’s pricing decisions focus 
on factors other than cost.
The Author recently received a newsletter from Charles River Associates ("CRA"), 
economic consultants, outlining their advice to a client seeking CRA's advice on the 
pricing of a drug newly designated as an Orphan Drug. Fair Pricing for New Products: 
Orphan Drugs, CRA REV. (Charles River Assoc., Inc., Boston, Mass., Jan. 1992) (on file 
with Utah Law Review). CRA’s study of the issue listed the factors it relied upon in 
fashioning their advice to the unnamed client as follows:
(1) How much money would payers save overall by covering the new
therapy in lieu of alternative therapies?
(2) What are the major constraints and opportunities in terms of reim-
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examples include EPO for treating end stage renal failure,38 
Protropin or Human Growth Hormone for treating dwarfism,39 
AZT for treating AIDS,40 and instances of Orphan Drugs in the
bursement, legislative, and market issues, and how would these factors 
relate to pricing the client’s product?
(3) What price for the drug would be considered "fair" in relation to prices 
of similar therapies and traditional industry practice?
(4) What price would allow the firm to meet its revenue goals?
Id. at 2. '
In developing its analysis, CRA focused on the value of the benefit received by the 
patient from receiving the drug, priced at $10,000 in "economic benefit." Id  "Economic 
benefit" was measured in terms of enhanced potential wage earning, reduced demands 
on the time of friends and relatives in providing care, and reductions in the need for at­
tendant care and lower direct medical costs for hospitalization and other drug therapies. 
Id  Other factors like comparable pricing practices by other drug companies and public 
and other expressions of concerns over the pricing of Orphan Drugs were taken account 
of in setting a "fair price." A reduction of 25% from the "economic benefit price" of 
$10,000 was suggested in light of these factors and was adopted by the client. Id. at 2-3.
What is noteworthy, but not unexpected, about this description of the process for 
setting price is that it is pricing based on the principle of what the traffic will bear, 
divorced from the cost of producing the product, including regulatory compliance costs. 
The problem of covering costs to bring the drug to market is simply assumed and it is 
further assumed that the client is free to "meet its revenue goals." Id  at 2. It is a form 
of monopoly pricing discretion, one expressly sanctioned by the Act and one CRA appears 
to have advised its client to exercise. While it may be "fair" monopoly pricing from a 
cynical and tactical political point of view, it nevertheless is monopoly pricing from an 
economic point of view which would not occur in a competitive market or in a rate- 
regulated one.
38. See 137 CONG REC. E1171 (daily ed. April 10,1991) (statement of Congressman 
Stark) (citing cost of EPO to Medicare of $265 million in one year and development costs 
for the drug of $170 million).
39., Id  (costs of $45 million to develop the drug and sales in 1989 of $123 million).
40. Philip J. Hilts, Wave o f Protests Developing On Profits from AIDS Drug, N. Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 16, 1989, § 1, at 1. The article estimates the initial price for annual AZT 
treatments at $8,000, that the costs of bringing the drug to market were between $80 to 
$180 million, and sales for one year generated $220 million and profits of as much as 
$100 million. With the increase in AIDS patients, sales are estimated to top $1 billion 
by 1992. The manufacturer reduced prices in the face of protests to around $6500 per 
year in 1989. Tregarthen, supra note 21, at A13.
It should be noted that some Orphan Drugs on which apparently exorbitant profits 
have been made have independent patent protection and many are the result of 
government funded research resulting in patented drugs with exclusive licenses to 
private drug manufacturers. The marketing of a particular drug may be protected from 
competition by one monopoly grant piled on another. Independent patent protection may 
be added to Orphan Drug protection from competition, or an exclusive patent license on 
government held patents may confer an added level of exclusivity to a drug designated 
an Orphan Drug. Monopoly pricing, therefore, may be due in part to patent rights, 
questionable extensions of the patent grant by adding Orphan Drug exclusivity protec­
tion to expiring patent protection and unwise licensing practices for federally funded 
research resulting in private patents or exclusive licenses of government held patents. 
The issue of the scope and length of drug patents is reviewed in Desrosiers, supra note
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United States being priced up to ten times more than they are in 
other countries with competitive markets for the drug.41 The 
resulting monopoly tax upon the victims of relatively rare diseases 
and their public and private insurers and the contribution to 
spiraling health care costs have all brought repeated attempts to 
curb the scope of the Act—most noticeably proposals to limit or 
curb the seven year exclusive marketing right42
Frequently, the basis of the discovery of drugs useful in 
treating diseases is the product of government funded research or 
the research of government scientists. For example, AZT was in 
part the product of research by government scientists, yet Orphan 
Drug status for the drug has given an exclusive seven-year 
monopoly over distribution of the drug to a private company.43 
There is now litigation challenging the validity of the private 
company’s AZT patent on the grounds that it was not the inven­
tor.44 The orphan drug Taxol, useful in treating ovarian and 
other forms of cancer, is the product of government funded 
research isolating Taxol from the bark of pacific yew trees nearly 
thirty years ago.45 The monopoly granted over marketing Taxol 
has been considerably expanded by an arrangement between the 
National Cancer Institute and the company holding the Orphan
2, at 115. The farther issue of extending the life of drug patents to compensate for delays 
in FDA marketing approval of patented drugs is criticized in Mezrich, supra note 26, 
passim.
41. Thomas states:
For example, in the United States aerosol pentamidine is an orphan drug 
with a monopoly that supports a retail price up to $300 per vial. This same 
drug is available in Europe from a competitor for approximately $30 per 
vial. The enormous price disparity is evidence that the high domestic price 
does not represent mere cost recovery, but is a result of the artificial 
monopoly. Similarly, erythropoietin, an orphan drug in the U.S., is 
available more cheaply in Germany and Switzerland from competitors.
Thomas, supra note 2, at 428; see also Desrosiers, supra note 2, at 133 (reviewing 
evidence which suggested that price of Valium in United States was 342% higher than 
in United Kingdom and 243% higher than in Canada).
42. See, e.g., H.R. 5421, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (proposed excess profits tax 
after the holder of an Orphan Drug designation recaptures two times its developmental 
costs and generates up to 25% annual profit). The Orphan Drug Amendments of 1990, 
adopted by Congress and pocket vetoed by President Bush, provided loss of exclusivity 
once the patient population exceeds 200,000 and for shared exclusivity in the case of 
simultaneous discovery where the drug was predicted to be profitable from the start.
H.R 4638, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
43. Mezrich, supra note 26, at 83-84; Tregarthen, supra note 21, at A13.
44. Mezrich, supra note 26, at 85.
45. Tregarthen, supra note 21, at A13.
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Drug designation for Taxol, Bristol-Meyers Squibb, through a 
cooperative research and development agreement giving Bristol 
exclusive rights to all pacific yew trees on federal lands.46 The 
agreement is no different than the grant of royal franchises and 
monopolies condemned four centuries ago by the Statute of 
Monopolies.47
Throughout its relatively short life, the Orphan Drug Act has 
proved to be a source of controversy, particularly the grant of 
seven years of marketing exclusivity conferring an exclusive 
monopoly over the sale of designated Orphan Drugs. To date the 
debates have concerned whether Congress should or should not 
have granted such a monopoly or whether it should modify the 
monopoly granted to prevent the abuses which have arisen. No
46. Love, supra note 11, at 1. On average, the bark of four Pacific Yew trees is 
required to produce a sufficient amount of Taxol to treat one patient. Marilyn Chase, 
Scientists Say Progress Is Made in Taxol Search, WALL ST. J., March 18, 1992, at B l. 
Extensive research is taking place with the objective of artificially synthesizing the Taxol 
molecule's "central core." Id.
47. The Statute of Monopolies provided in part:
"[A]ll monopolies, and all commissions, grants, licenses, charters, and 
letters-patent, heretofore made or granted, or hereafter to be made or 
granted, to any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate whatsoever, 
of or for the sole buying, selling, making, working or using of anything, 
within this realm or the dominion of Wales, or of any other monopolies," 
and all licenses to do anything contrary to law "are altogether contrary to 
the laws of this realm, and so are and shall be utterly void . . .  ."
1 E r n e s t  P . L ip sc o m b  III, W a l k e r  o n  Pa t e n ts  § 1.15 (3d ed. 1985) (quoting English 
Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jac. 1 ch. 3 (1623)).
The practice of sanctioning patents on discoveries made with the assistance of 
federal funds under 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-11 (1988) and transferring discoveries made in 
government labs under the Federal Technology Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3711a 
(1988), raises the possible constitutional issue of circumventing the underlying 
philosophy of the Patent Clause by government action deterring the progress of science 
and the useful arts: In effect, a government subsidy is being used in addition to the 
patent incentive intended to induce private inventors to disclose ideas. Where the 
government obtains the patent right and then grants an exclusive license to the 
government-held patent, there is a circumvention of the purpose of the Patent Clause by 
government granting monopoly patent rights without any further disclosure of a new 
idea by the private beneficiary of the exclusive licence. Government funded research, 
either in government labs or private ones, should result in public access to the 
government produced new "Discoveries."
Otherwise, consumers end up paying twice for the invention: First, by funding the 
research, whether it be public or private; and, second, by the payment of monopoly prices 
for products using the patented idea or subject matter developed with federal funds. 
These issues are in need of serious study by Congress and reform of the practice of 
exclusive licensing of government held patents and more careful review of private 
ownership interests in patents derived from federally funded research. For a discussion 
of some of these issues, see Love, supra note 11, at 11-18.
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one has raised the deeper and more serious question of whether 
Congress has the power to grant such a monopoly in the first 
instance and whether it may do so under the Commerce Clause 
rather than the Patent Clause of the Constitution.
It is the position of this Article that the Act’s seven year 
exclusive marketing right confers a patent right without conform­
ing to the limitations of the Patent Clause of the Constitution, 
and, in adopting the Act, Congress unconstitutionally exercised its 
power under the Commerce Clause in passing a statute creating 
a patent right it could only pass pursuant to and in conformity 
with the Patent Clause of the Constitution.48 This conclusion 
means that the congressional grant of power to the FDA to confer 
rights of marketing exclusivity to designated suppliers of Orphan 
Drugs is unconstitutional, and those grants of exclusivity which 
the FDA has made are void and of no legal force and effect. Com­
peting applicants for marketing existing Orphan Drugs are 
entitled to have their applications considered and implemented by 
the FDA and those paying monopoly prices for Orphan Drugs are 
being overcharged as the result of an unconstitutional statute 
precluding competition from determining the prices they pay for
48. There is another serious and substantial problem, with the FDA’s administration 
of the Act, beyond the scope of this Article, which deserves mention. The FDA refuses 
to hold hearings where there are two or more competing applicants for the use of the 
same drug for the same orphan disease. In its proposed Orphan Drug Regulations, 56 
Fed. Reg. 3338, 3344 (1991) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 316 (proposed Jan. 29,1991)), 
the FDA asserts that "[n]either the Constitution, nor the Administrative Procedure Act, 
nor the Orphan Drug Act requires a hearing on any issue of this kind." This statement 
obviously conflicts with the Ashbacker doctrine set forth in Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. 
F.C.C., 326 U.S. 327 (1945), requiring a hearing where there are two mutually exclusive 
applications for a governmental license. IcL at 329*30. That the statute does not provide 
for a hearing is not dispositive. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33,49-50 (1950). 
In addition, § 9(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") expressly provides: 
When application is made for a license required by law, the agency, with 
due regard for the rights and privileges of all interested parties or adverse­
ly affected persons and within a reasonable time, shall set and complete 
proceedings required to be conducted in accordance with sections 556 and 
557 of this title or other proceedings required by law and shall make its 
decision.
5 U.S.C. § 558(c) (1988). '
The refusal of the FDA to comply with the hearing requirements of the APA is 
also a politically unwise policy because it leaves the agency with secret and unreviewable 
decision-making power in handing out exclusive rights of great economic value. It is 
inevitable that charges ranging from favoritism to corruption will arise in such circum­
stances, whether real or imagined, and the integrity of the Agency will be constantly at 
risk with so much at stake in receiving a grant of market exclusivity.
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II. C o n stitu tio n a l D iff ic u lt ie s  w ith  th e  
O rphan D ru g  A c t
A  Patent Clause Limitations 
on the Power Of Congress
The Patent Clause of the United States Constitution provides 
that Congress shall have power "To promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries."49 The power conferred has long been recognized as 
being only for the limited public purpose of promoting the progress 
of science and useful arts; reward to the inventor is secondary and 
subservient to this public purpose.50 Consequently,
' it is well settled that Congress cannot constitutionally enact 
legislation conferring exclusive patent rights upon discoverers
49. U.S. C o n st ., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
50. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510-11 
(1917):
Since Pennock v. Dialogue [27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1 (1829)] was decided in 1829 
this court has consistently held that the primary purpose of our patent laws 
is not the creation of private fortunes for the owners of patents but is "to 
promote the progress of science and useful arts" an object and purpose au­
thoritatively expressed by Mr. Justice Story, in that decision, saying;
"While one great object [of our patent laws] was, by 
holding out a reasonable reward to inventors, and giving them 
an exclusive right to their inventions for a limited period, to 
stimulate the efforts of genius; the main object was 'to pro­
mote the progress of science and useful arts."
Thirty years later this court, returning to the subject in Kendall v. 
Winsor [62 U.S. (21 How.) 322 (1858)], again pointedly and significantly 
says: .
"It is undeniably true, that the limited and temporary 
monopoly granted to inventors was never designed for their 
exclusive profit or advantage; the benefit to the public or 
community at large was another and doubtless the primary 
object in granting and securing that monopoly."
Id  at 510-11 (citations omitted).
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of subject matter that is not "new." Similarly, abstract 
thoughts and theories including mechanical and scientific 
principles and laws of nature, though constituting "discover­
ies" of the most fundamental sort, are not within the scope of 
congressional prerogative under the patent clause of the 
Constitution, because exclusive appropriation, even for a 
limited period, would rob the public of access to elemental 
building blocks of creative thought and thereby stifle "Prog­
ress of Science and useful Arts." Consonant with these 
principles, every patent statute enacted by Congress under the 
Constitution has carefully defined the inventions for which 
patents may be granted as products or processes (i.e., "arts") 
that are both new and useful. It is likewise settled, consistent 
with every patent statute so far enacted, that under the 
Constitution the patent right must be confined to a limited 
time, must be an exclusive right, and must be secured only to , 
"inventors."51
The history of the patent clause, traceable to European and 
English experience with unfettered sovereign grants of exclusive 
privileges or state monopolies,62 suggests that it was intended to 
be both a carefully crafted and limited power and one carrying the 
implication that congressional power to create otherwise unregu­
lated monopolies is confined to the limited public purpose stated 
in the Patent Clause and constrained by the conditions expressly 
placed upon congressional exercise of that power.
One set of problems with the Orphan Drug Act is that the 
creation of the seven year exclusive marketing right for drugs to 
treat orphan diseases has all the earmarks of the creation of a 
patent right.53 But the statute does not conform to the express
51. Edward S. Irons and Mary H. Sears, The Constitutional Standard o f Inven­
tion—The Touchstone for Patent Reform, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 653,654 (citations omitted).
52. Id. at 658-62.
53. The length of the grant of exclusivity conferred by the Orphan Drug Act, seven 
years, coincides with the common law length of the monopoly granted over industrial 
processes. The common law grant was based on the institution of seven-year apprentice­
ships. See Dale A. Nance, Forward, Owning Ideas, 13 HARV. J.L . & PUB. P oi/Y  757, 760
(1990). See generally BRUCE W. BUGBEE, THE GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPY­
RIGHT LAW (1967). The length of "limited times" for which Congress may adopt laws con­
ferring patent rights is not spelled out in the Constitution. Originally, the term was for 
14 years, twice the term of the common law grant of a monopoly over industrial 
processes and apprenticeships. See generally Desrosiers, supra note 2 (discussing drug 
patent terms). The fact that the exclusive marketing right under the Orphan Drug Act
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limitations upon the exercise of the patent power because: (1) the 
Orphan Drug Act was not adopted to promote "the Progress of 
Science and the Useful Arts1 by securing the disclosure of "Discov­
eries," but is designed to give an economic incentive to drug 
manufacturers to invest in developing drugs for rare diseases 
whether they meet the standard of being contributions to the 
progress of science and the useful arts or not;54 (2) drugs qualify­
ing for Orphan Drug status need not meet the new "Discoveries" 
or innovation standard required by the Patent Clause of the 
Constitution in order to receive the seven year marketing monopo­
ly authorized by the Act;55 and (3) the right of exclusivity can be
is for seven years has no implication for the question of whether the Act grants a patent 
right or not because it is the grant of an otherwise unregulated right to have others 
excluded for "limited times."
54. There is a deeper set of philosophical issues with regard to the reasons for 
sanctioning a governmental power to grant a monopoly over ideas in a free society. Is the 
purpose of doing so the vesting of a property like right in those contributing the idea to 
the common fund of knowledge, or is it a utilitarian recognition of the need to provide 
an incentive to the creators of ideas so that inventors will reveal their ideas to the public 
in order to promote further innovation and the progress of science and the useful arts? 
Are the rights created "property" rights or the temporary creation of a private franchise 
to fulfill the goal of advancing the public interest of progress in science and the useful 
arts and only to the extent necessary to induce disclosure? For a thoughtful and full 
exploration of these issues, see Symposium on Law and Philosophy, 13 HARV. J. L. & 
PUB. Pol’Y No. 3 (1990).
Whichever view one takes, it is unusual for a free society to carve out certain ideas 
and the expressions of them for grants of individual monopolies. Nance, supra note 53, 
at 761-67. Because of this and the underlying principle that the federal government is 
one of limited and delegated powers, exercise of the power granted by the Patent Clause 
should be held to a high standard of conformity to the public purpose of the grant of the 
power and the express constitutional limitations upon its exercise. Consequently, 
legislation implementing the powers granted by the Patent Clause should be exercised 
"only for a limited purpose—'to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’" Irons
& Sears, supra note 51, at 653.
55. Consistent with the Constitutional requirement of novelty, the Patent Code 
imposes three interrelated conditions for patentability: novelty, utility, and non­
obviousness. Title 35 U.S.C. § 101 requires that an invention or discovery be "new and 
useful." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). Title 35 U.S.C. § 102 precludes the issuance of a patent 
where the invention is anticipated in the prior art. Id. § 102. Title 35 U.S.C. § 103 
precludes issuance of a patent where "the subject matter as a whole would have been 
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art 
to which said subject matter pertains." Id. § 103. The Supreme Court has long 
acknowledged that under the Constitution, as well as the Patent Code, "that there be 
some 'invention* to be entitled to patent protection." Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 
273, 279 (1976); see also Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 292, 320 (1833). The FDA does 
not and is not authorized or competent to make these kinds of evaluations under the 
Orphan Drug Act.
The meaning of the concept "invention" has had a long and controversial history.
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granted to a non-inventor in violation of the express limitation of 
the patent clause of "securing" patent rights only to ,,Inventors.,,56 
A second set of issues arises because Congress adopted the Act 
pursuant to its power to regulate commerce, and if the Act results 
in the creation of a patent right; the question is raised as to 
whether Congress can adopt laws pursuant to one of its delegated 
powers that it is specifically authorized to adopt by a carefully 
limited grant of power found in another.
B. The Nature of Patent Rights and Limitations 
on Congressional Exercise of the Patent Power
"It must never be forgotten that the federal government is 
one of enumerated powers and that it does not possess a general
See E. Wyndham Hulme, The History o f the Patent System Under the Prerogative and at 
Common Law, 12 L.Q. REV. 141 (1896); Frank D. Prager, Standards o f Patentable 
Invention From 1474 to 1952, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 69 (1952). Considerable controversy 
exists because of Supreme Court language in cases like Sakraida seemingly establishing 
a higher standard of invention than that required by 35 U.S.C. § 103, a decision the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has been undermining. Whatever 
level of "invention" one wishes to argue for, it is clear that the Constitution does require 
that a patent only be issued for "Discoveries" promoting the "progress of science and 
useful arts." The Orphan Drug Act contains no requirement of invention or that the 
designated drug be a new "Discovery", even if one disregards the manner in which the 
invention was made, in order to gain seven years of market exclusivity.
56. The limitation upon the grant of a patent to a non-inventor is explicit in the 
Constitution and has been a strictly enforced and consistent requirement of the patent 
laws. The Supreme Court has held that the granting of a patent to a non-inventor results 
in the invalidity of the patent. In Kennedy v. Hazelton, 128 U.S. 667, 672 (1888), the 
Court held:
A patent which is not supported by the oath of the inventor, but 
applied for by one who is not the inventor, is unauthorized by law, and 
void, and, whether taken out in the name of the applicant or any assignee 
of his, confers no rights against the public. . .  . [A] court of equity will not 
order him to assign it to the plaintiff. . .  because its only possible value or 
use to the plaintiff would be to enable him to impose upon the public by 
asserting rights under a void patent.
Id. at 672 (citations omitted). See generally 1 LIPSCOMB, supra note 47, §§ 3.1, 3.2.
Consistent with the requirement of the Constitution that a patent may only be 
granted to "Inventors'1, the Patent Code precludes issuance of a patent to anyone other 
than the inventor of the subject matter sought to be patented. See 35 U.S.C. § 102©
(1988). Courts are liberal in permitting correction of mistakes in designating the 
inventor.
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police power."57 Each of the branches of the Federal Government 
can only act pursuant to and within the limits of a specific grant 
of power found in the Constitution. The principal delegation of 
powers to Congress, powers limited by the introductory language 
of Article 1, section 1 conferring only the "legislative powers herein 
granted,"58 is found in Article 1, section 8 of the Constitution. All 
of the powers granted are inherently limited by the terms of the 
grant and some of them have express conditions attached to the 
exercise of the power granted, as, for example, the requirement 
that rules on naturalization and bankruptcy be "uniform." Article 
I, section 9 goes farther to specify categories of laws which may 
not be enacted pursuant to the limited powers granted Congress. 
That the powers granted are limited ones is reaffirmed by the 
Tenth Amendment, which provides: "powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution . . . are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people".
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that 
the Patent Clause of the Constitution expressly limits the power 
of Congress to enact legislation granting patent rights. In Graham 
v. John Deere Co.,59 the Court held:
The [Patent] clause is both a grant of power and a limitation.
This qualified authority, unlike the power often exercised in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by the English 
Crown, is limited to the promotion of advances in the ‘useful 
arts/ . . . The Congress in the exercise of the patent power
57. J o h n  E. N o w a k  e t  a l ., C o n stitu tio n a l  La w  128 (3d ed. 1986).
58. L a u r e n c e  H. T r ibe , Am e r ic a n  C o n stitu tio n a l  L a w  § 5-1, at 297 (2d ed. 1988). 
Professor Tribe notes that the Supreme Court has "largely abandoned any efforts to 
articulate and enforce internal limits on congressional power—limits inherent in the 
grants of powers themselves." Id. Instead he suggests that the Court has been concerned 
primarily with developing "external'1 or structural limits on the powers of Congress 
through devices like the separation of powers and federalism. Id.
These observations concern attempts to limit the scope of grants of power like the 
commerce power by the terms of the grant itself. The circumstances presented by the 
Orphan Drug Act concern limitations upon one grant of power imposed by another. The 
two grants of power involved in the case of the Orphan Drug Act both appear within the 
same section of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8. Consequently, the issue 
presented here is not only the limited nature of the grants of delegated power to 
Congress, but an interpretation of how the grant of the general commerce power relates 
to the grant of the limited patent power and whether the former can be used to override 
or circumvent the limitations upon the latter.
59. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
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may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated 
constitutional purpose. Nor may it enlarge the patent monopo­
ly without regard to the innovation, advancement or social 
benefit gained thereby. . . . Innovation, advancement, and 
things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent 
requisites in a patent system which by constitutional com­
mand must 'promote the Progress o f. . . useful Arts.’ This is 
the standard expressed in the Constitution and it may not be 
ignored.60
In the earlier case of Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Super­
market Equip. Cojp.,61 Justice Douglas in concurrence empha­
sized the same theme when he stated:
It is worth emphasis that every patent case involving 
validity presents a question which requires reference to a 
standard written into the Constitution. Article 1, section 8 
contains a grant to the Congress of the power to permit 
patents to be issued. But, unlike most of the specific powers 
which Congress is given, that grant is qualified. The Congress 
does not have free rein, for example, to decide that patents 
should be easily or freely given. The Congress acts under the 
restraint imposed by the statement of purpose in Art. I, § 8.
The purpose is "To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts ... ." The means for achievement of that end is the grant 
for a limited time to inventors of the exclusive right to their 
inventions.
Every patent is the grant of a privilege of exacting tolls 
from the public. The Framers plainly did not want those 
monopolies freely granted. The invention, to justify a patent, 
had to serve the ends of science—to push back the frontiers of 
chemistry, physics, and the like; to make a distinctive con­
tribution to scientific knowledge. That is why through the 
years the opinions of the Court commonly have taken "inven­
tive genius"62 as the test. It is not enough that the article is
60. Id. at 5-6.
61. 340 U.S. 147 (1950).
62. [by the Author] See also Cuno Eng. Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp, 314 U.S. 
84, 91 (1941), where Justice Douglas required a showing of "creative genius" for 
patentability. The concepts of "inventive" and "creative genius" have created considerable 
controversy and long standing debates concerning the standard or level of "invention"
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new and useful. The Constitution never sanctioned the 
patenting of gadgets. Patents serve a higher end—the ad­
vancement of science. An invention need not be as startling as 
an atomic bomb to be patentable. But it has to be of such 
quality and distinction that masters of the scientific field in 
which it falls will recognize it as an advance.63
While some have criticized these holdings,64 they are decisions in 
accord with long-standing Supreme Court decisions concerning the 
constitutional limitations of the Patent Clause upon the power of 
Congress to create patent rights.65
In 1989 the Court reaffirmed its holding that the patent 
clause is both a grant and a limitation of power to the federal 
government. In Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc,66 
a preemption case, the Court affirmed a Florida Supreme Court 
judgment striking down a Florida statute which prohibited the use 
of a direct molding process to duplicate unpatented boat hulls.67 
In the course of the opinion finding the Florida statute conflicted 
with the balance struck by the Constitution in the Patent Clause 
and by Congress in the federal patent laws between the encour­
agement of invention and free competition in unpatented ideas, 
Justice O’Connor speaking for a unanimous Court stated:
The Patent Clause [of the Constitution] itself reflects a
which should be required for patentability on both a constitutional and statutory basis. 
See Prager, supra note 55, at 69-70. Some view the amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 103, 
providing that "[patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the 
invention was made," Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 798 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988)), 
as modifying Justice Douglas’s test of "creative genius" and tests like that put forth by 
Thurman Arnold in Potts v. Coe, 145 F.2d 27, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1944) imposing a higher 
standard of invention upon corporate research labs. Whether this is the case or not as 
a matter of statutory construction, the issue here is the Constitutional standard 
mandated by the requirement that patents may only be granted for "Discoveries" 
promoting the "progress of Science and Useful Arts."
63. 340 U.S. at 154.
64. See, e.g., Albert B. Kimball, Jr., An Analysis o f Recent Supreme Court Assertions 
Regarding A Constitutional Standard o f Invention, 1 Am . Pat. L. A s s ’N Q.J. 204 (1973).
65. See, e.g., Thompson v. Boisselier, 114 U.S. 1, 11 (1885); Hollister v. Benedict & 
Burnham Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 59, 73 (1885). See generally Irons & Sears, supra note 51, 
passim (discussing requirements for invention in United States).
66. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
67. This result was predicted and explored by John B. Sganga, Direct Molding 
Statutes: Potent Weapons, but are they Constitutional, 71 J. PAT. OFF. & TRADEMARK 
SOC’Y 71 (1989).
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balance between the need to encourage innovation and the 
avoidance of-monopolies which stifle competition without any 
concomitant advance in the "Progress of Science and the 
useful Arts." As we have noted in the past, the clause contains 
both a grant of power and certain limitations upon the 
exercise of that power. Congress may not create patent 
monopolies of unlimited duration, nor may it "authorize the 
issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent 
knowledge from the public domain or to restrict free access to 
materials already available." Graham v. John Deere Co. of 
Kansas City., 383 U.S. 1, 6, 86 S. a . 684, 688, 15 L. Ed. 2d 
545 (1966).
From their inception, the federal patent laws have 
embodied a careful balance between the need to promote 
innovation and the recognition that imitation and refinement 
through imitation are both necessary to invention itself and 
the very lifeblood of a competitive economy.68
Justice O’Connor went on to note that the patent laws have 
always excluded from consideration for patent protection knowl­
edge which is already available to the public. Citing Justice Story's 
opinion in Pennock v. Dialogue^ Justice O’Connor wrote:
the federal patent scheme creates a limited opportunity to 
obtain a property right in an idea. Once an inventor has 
decided to lift the veil of secrecy from his work, he must 
choose between the protection of a federal patent or the 
dedication of his idea to the public at large.70
In addition to the requirements of novelty and utility, Justice 
O’Connor noted that the federal patent law has "long required that 
an innovation not be anticipated by prior art in the field" and that 
"[t]aken together, the novelty and nonobviousness requirements 
express a congressional determination that the purposes behind 
the Patent Clause are best served by free competition and 
exploitation of that which is either already available to the public,
68. 489 U.S. at 146 (citations omitted).
69. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1 (1829), a case involving an attempt to patent a new technique 
for the manufacture of rubber hose seven years after it had first been reduced to practice 
and sold to the public.
70. 489 U.S. at 149.
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or that which may be readily discerned from publicly available 
material."71 The opinion further states:
The federal patent system thus embodies a carefully crafted 
bargain for encouraging the creation and disclosure of new, 
useful, and non-obvious advances in technology and design in 
return for the exclusive right to practice the invention for a 
period of years. . ..
The attractiveness of such a bargain, and its effective­
ness in inducing creative effort and disclosure of the results of 
that effort, depend almost entirely on a backdrop of free 
competition in the exploitation of unpatented designs and 
innovations. The novelty and nonobviousness requirements of 
patentability embody a congressional understanding, implicit 
in the Patent Clause itself, that free exploitation of ideas will 
be the rule, to which the protection of a federal patent is the 
exception.72
The Court’s decision in the Bonito Boats case reflects the well 
established understanding that the Patent Clause of the Constitu­
tion prevents Congress from creating: (1) patent rights of unlimit­
ed duration; (2) patent rights where there is no conferring of the 
public benefit of promoting the progress of science and useful arts; 
(3) patent rights where the effect of a grant of exclusivity is to 
restrict free access to materials in the public domain or which 
displace free competition in the exploitation of innovation not 
rising to the constitutional level of "Discoveries"; or, (4) patent 
rights which are conferred upon non-inventors.73 On its face and.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 150-51.
73. Id. at 145-54. The farther argument made by some that Congress may not grant 
inventors less than absolute exclusivity in their ideas is not listed as a constitutional 
constraint upon the power of Congress to grant less than an absolute right of exclusivity 
in view of the primacy of the public purpose of promoting the Progress of Science and the 
Useful Arts. This argument is put forward with respect to laws permitting some level of 
use of patented ideas by non-patent holders in the drug area for research. See Patti, 
supra note 26, at 567. Such an argument elevates reward to the inventor above the 
public purpose expressly stated in the Constitution and assumes that Congress is not 
free to enact patent laws or exercise less than the full power granted by the Patent 
Clause in a manner consistent with the public purpose of promoting the-progress of 
science and the useful arts. The constitutional restrictions of "Discoveries,1 "limited 
times," and "Inventors" are all directly related to insuring the primary purpose of 
delegating power to Congress to adopt a patent system is the public one of "promoting 
the progress of Science and Useful Arts."
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as applied, the Orphan Drug Act violates the above list of 
constraints upon Congressional power to create patent rights, save 
the limitation upon creating patent rights of unlimited duration, 
if it is found that the Act creates a "patent right" falling within 
this list of constraints upon Congressional power to enact patent 
laws.
The dictionary definition of a "patent" has been generally 
stated to be a "grant of some privilege, property or authority made 
by government or the sovereign of a country to one or more 
individuals1 and more particularly as a "grant of the right to 
exclude others."74 The Latin derivation of the words "letters 
patent," litteraepatentes, means "open letters" or an open letter or 
document from a sovereign for specific purposes.75 A standard 
definition of the patent right is that it is the conferring by 
government of an exclusive and unregulated right to make, to use, 
or to vend a new and useful invention.76 The meaning of the 
concept "patent right" is deeply dependent upon the history of pat­
ents. That history is intertwined with the practice of the English 
Crown of granting royal monopolies or exclusive privileges or 
franchises over the right to engage in trade, as well as over new 
discoveries, to favored members of the Court. The practice gener­
ated great political opposition in England and resulted in the
74. B la c k ’s  L aw  D ic tio n ar y  1125 (6th ed. 1990).
75. 1 LIPSCOMB, supra note 47, § 1.1.
76. The grant of either an exclusive right to make, or to use, or to vend can 
constitute a patent right. Title 35 U.S.C. § 154 states: "Every patent shall contain . . . 
a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns . . .  of the right to exclude others from 
making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United States . . . 3 5  U.S.C. § 
154 (1988).
The issue of whether an idea granted a governmental monopoly is a patent right 
can arise under § 102 of the Patent Code, the novelty requirement. Id. § 102. Section 102 
bars the grant of a patent where an invention is patented elsewhere before the appl­
icant’s invention or one year before the filing of an application. IcL Thus, issuance in a 
foreign country of a patent-like right prior to the U.S. application, will bar the grant of 
a U.S. patent where the foreign grant is found to be the equivalent of a patent. For 
example, in Atlas Glass Co. v. Simonds Mfg., 102 F. 643 (3rd Cir. 1900), the court held 
that a Danish "eneret" was a patent within the meaning of § 102 even though it 
conferred only the exclusive right to make the patented device in Denmark. Id. at 646-47. 
The court held the essence of a patent right is the grant of an exclusive privilege from 
a sovereign where the privilege amounts to a substantial monopoly over making the 
subject matter. Id. at 646. The government grant of an exclusive and unregulated right 
to vend, standing alone, is consistently recognized as the grant of a patent right by cases 
dealing with the validity of state laws creating such a right and challenged on 
preemption grounds.
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adoption of the Statute of Monopolies.77 That law declared that 
the granting of "[a]ll monopolies and all commissions, grants, li­
censes, charters and letters patent" was "contrary to the laws of 
this realm and so are and shall be utterly void." The law made an 
exception for "letters patents and grants of privilege for the term 
of fourteen years or under . . .  of the sole working or making of 
any manner of new manufacture within this realm, to the true 
and first inventor or inventors of such manufactures . . . .,l78
Letters patent were a species of royal grants of exclusive 
rights within the genus of sovereign-created exclusive monopoly 
rights to exclude others from a business or a trade, a form of 
sovereign franchise of monopoly rights granted for a limited time 
and only to inventors of new ideas. All other exclusive letters 
patents or sovereign grants of exclusive rights were deemed to be 
null and void—the implicit result found in the Constitution by 
spelling out a power to regulate commerce and the express 
limitation upon the granting of monopolies spelled out in the 
Patent Clause.
Continuation of the practice of granting royal monopolies and 
their imposition on the American colonies directly contributed to 
the American Revolution and the institution of a democratic 
governments of limited powers. Colonial governments adopted 
general prohibitions upon the creation of monopolies, with narrow 
and limited exceptions for new inventions that benefitted the 
community and were granted only for a short time.79 An underly­
ing philosophy in favor of every person having the freedom to use
77. 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (1623), reprinted in LOUIS B . SCHWARTZ, JOHN J. FLYNN &  HARRY 
F ir s t , F r e e  E n t e r p r is e  a n d  E c o n o m ic  O rg a n iz a t io n : A n t i t r u s t  1-2 (6th ed. 1983). 
See generally BUGBEE, supra note 53, passim.
78. 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, FLYNN & FIRST, supra note 77, at 1-2. 
Coke’s Second Institute, Commentary on Magna Carta, published in 1642 listed among 
the great "liberties" guaranteed by Magna Carta a prohibition upon the creation of 
monopolies. Id. Coke stated:
[I]f a graunt be made to any man, to have the sole making of cards, 
or the sole dealing with any other trade, that graunt is against the liberty 
and free dome of the subject, that before did, or lawfully might have used 
that trade, and consequently this great charter
Generally all monopolies are against this great charter, because they 
are against the liberty and free dome of the subject, and against the law of 
the land.
Coke’s Second Institute, Commentary on Magna Carta, reprinted in ROSCOE POUND, THE 
D e v e lo p m e n t  o f  C o n s t i t u t io n a l  G u a r a n te e s  o f  l i b e r t y  150 (1957).
79. Irons & Sears, supra note 51, at 664-67.
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ideas—with an exception made only to the extent that the public 
would benefit by giving an exclusive franchise over a new discov­
ery to the inventor for a limited time in order to stimulate 
disclosure of the idea so that progress in science could take place 
suffused the times—resulted in the drafting of the limited power 
found in the Patent Clause of the Constitution.80 No express 
power was granted Congress to create otherwise unlimited and 
unregulated monopolies generally and it can clearly be maintained 
that the Patent Clause was not only a narrowly crafted exception 
to the underlying philosophy in favor of every person having the 
freedom to use ideas otherwise in the public domain, but that it is 
also an expression of a prohibition: that the federal government is 
precluded from granting any otherwise unregulated and exclusive 
monopoly to an individual or firm other than those conforming to 
the limitations of the Patent Clause.81
Modem American patent law is directly traceable to the
80. Id. at 669-71. There is a rich scholarship seeking to explain the economic 
justifications for and against a patent system. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and 
Function o f the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977); Mark R. Grady & Jay I. 
Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 Va. L. Rev. 305, 311-49 (1992). Such 
scholarship is relevant to the decision of Congress to adopt patent laws and the decision 
of what the scope of the laws adopted should or should not be. It is only marginally rele­
vant to the issues addressed here concerning the constitutional minimum which must 
be observed by Congress in adopting and defining the scope of laws creating patent 
rights.
81. Although unnecessary to the analysis of and beyond the scope of this Article, it 
is submitted that from an historical point of view, and in light of the reasons for the 
Revolutionary War and the circumstances surrounding the drafting of the United States 
Constitution, the Commerce Clause and the Patent Clause should be read together as 
establishing an implicit policy of precluding the federal government from granting 
private parties unregulated and exclusive monopolies over economic activity other than 
that authorized by the Patent Clause. The court practice of reading regulatory statutes 
strictly and in light of an in-going presumption in favor of competition regulating private 
economic activity not otherwise specifically regulated is a manifestation of this basic 
policy. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 335-72 (1963); Louis 
B. Schwartz, Legal Restriction o f Competition In the Regulated Industries: An Abdication 
of Judicial Responsibility, 67 HARV. L. Rev. 436 passim (1954). The recent tendency of 
Congress to adopt statutes like the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-544, 98 Stat. 2279 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 521-559 (West 1991)), 
precluding governmental rate regulation of local monopolies in the cable industry, are 
of questionable constitutional validity, save for the often unrealistic possibility that new 
entry may constrain otherwise unlimited monopoly pricing discretion of the monopolists. 
Congress, if not the courts, should develop a basic policy of refusing to create unregulat­
ed monopolies because of their obvious potential for imposing economic harm upon the 
public, if not because of the questionable constitutional power of Congress to even 
consider the possibility. On the other hand, this may be asking too much of a Congress 
dominated by political action committees.
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common law policy of banning government granted monopolies in 
favor of free and open competition82 and the Statute of Monopo­
lies, with a limited and narrow exception made for patents granted 
for limited times to inventors of new and useful ideas fostering 
science and the useful arts in exchange for disclosing and dedicat­
ing the idea to the public domain. Viewed in this way, it is clear 
that the patent system is an important and integral component of 
the competitive process because the incentives of a form of quasi­
property protection83 granted to inventors for a limited time are 
recognized as a part of the public interest in securing disclosure of 
new and useful ideas which will lead to further creativity and 
competition in improving on the ideas divulged by the patent.84
82. Twenty one years prior to the adoption of the Statute of Monopolies, the common 
law was relied upon to strike down the Royal grant of a monopoly over the importation 
and manufacture of playing cards in The Case of Monopolies, Darcy v. Allein, 11 Coke 
84b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260, 1263-64 (K.B. 1602). The King’s Bench found that "the Queen 
was deceived in her grant,. . .  as by the preamble appears, intended it to be for the weal 
public; and it will be employed for the private gain of the patentee, and for the prejudice 
of the weal public . . . Consequently, the Court held that the Act was "utterly void" 
under Magna Charta and the common law. Id. at 1265. See generally William C. Letwin, 
The English Common Law Concerning Monopolies, 21U. CHI. L. REV. 355,356-79 (1954); 
D. Seaborne Davies, Further Light on the Case o f Monopolies, 48 L.Q. Rev. 394 passim 
(1932) (discussing history of monopolies under English common law).
83. The doctrine of patent misuse, independent of antitrust constraints upon the use 
made of patent rights, restricts the patent holder from requiring the purchase of 
unpatented items in conjunction patented technology, imposing restraints upon a patent 
licensee from selling competing goods, or conditioning the grant of a patent license on 
an unrelated license. As such, the doctrine is a recognition of the limited nature of the 
rights granted by a patent: "that the patentee receives nothing from the law which he 
did not have before, and that the only effect of his patent is to restrain others from 
manufacturing, using or selling that which he has invented." Motion Picture Patents Co. 
v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510 (1917). The doctrine is an illustration of 
the less than full spectrum of property rights vested in a patentee, causing courts and 
commentators to describe patent rights as a form of "quasi-property" rights rather than 
"property" rights. On the general nature of "property rights, see John J. Flynn, The 
Chicken and the Egg in FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 69 
(Warren J. Samuels ed,, 1989).
84. See Potts v. Coe, 145 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1944) (Thurman Arnold's controversial 
decision requiring a higher level of invention for discoveries from corporate research labs 
in order to secure the true promotion of science and the useful arts. It is a decision which 
may have been modified as a matter of statutory interpretation by language added to 35 
U.S.C. § 103); see also supra note 62 (discussing Potts decision).
For a tracing of the historical roots of the Patent Clause and the constitutional 
standard for patent laws, see BUGBEE, supra note 53, passim; 1 LIPSCOMB, supra note
47, ch.l; Irons & Sears, supra note 51, at 653*58, 663-78. It should be noted that there 
is considerable criticism of the need and justification for exercising the power to grant 
sovereign protection of ideas in the form of patents, copyrights and other forms of 
intellectual properly. See generally Symposium, supra note 54, at 757.
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Consequently, the key elements of a patent right are that it is the 
governmental conferring of an otherwise unregulated and exclu­
sive monopoly right "to exclude others from the making, using or 
vending of the thing patented without the permission of the 
patentee."85 And, because of the express language of the Patent 
Clause, it is a right that can be conferred only for the purpose of 
promoting the progress of science and the useful arts and only for 
a limited time to inventors of new and useful discoveries.86 These 
limitations are imposed to fulfill the underlying purpose of 
granting the federal government the exclusive power to create pat­
ent rights; namely to secure the disclosure of new inventions so 
that society may benefit from that disclosure by knowing and 
understanding the idea patented. The basic objective of disclosure 
is the public one of stimulating further invention and creativity by 
securing disclosure and not the private one of simulating invest­
ment like that done through subsidies, tax credits, and the 
conferring of exclusive rights without the quid pro quo of the 
specific public benefit of promoting progress in science and the 
useful arts.
85. Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 538,549 (1853); see also United Shoe Mach. Corp. 
v. United States, 258 U.S. 451,463 (1922) ("[T]he franchise secured by a patent consists 
only in the right to exclude others from making, using, or vending the thing patented 
without the permission of the patentee.").
86. The requirement that the patented subject matter be both new and "useful" 
emphasizes the public purpose of the patent system. Granting patent protection to a new 
idea where there is no known use for the idea is precluded by the utility requirement. 
In Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966), Justice Fortas, writing for the Court, 
explained why "utility" has been a consistent requirement for patentability:
Whatever weight is attached to the value of encouraging disclosure 
and of inhibiting secrecy, we believe a more compelling consideration is 
that a process patent in the chemical field, which has not been developed 
and pointed to the degree of specific utility, creates a monopoly of 
knowledge which should be granted only if clearly commanded by the 
statute. Until the process claim has been reduced to production of a product 
shown to be useful, the metes and bounds of that monopoly are not capable 
of precise delineation. It may engross a vast and unknown, and perhaps un­
knowable area. Such a patent may confer power to block off whole areas of 
scientific development, without compensating benefit to the public. The 
basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for 
granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an 
invention with substantial utility. Unless and until a process is refined and 
developed to this point—where specific benefit exists in currently available 
form—there is insufficient justification for permitting an applicant to 
engross what may prove to be a broad field.
Id  at 534-35 (citations omitted).
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Some may argue that recognition of the limitations upon 
Congress’s power to confer patent rights may place in jeopardy a 
wide range of potentially similar rights of exclusivity. For example, 
Congress has conferred exclusive rights upon public utilities to 
provide interstate gas87 and electricity transmission service88 
and has conferred upon television and radio broadcasters exclusive 
frequencies to transmit their signals.89 In neither gas nor electric­
ity regulation has Congress conferred unregulated rights of 
exclusivity. The public need for avoiding the unnecessary duplica­
tion of utility plant to serve the public requiring the grant of a 
certificate of public convenience and necessity before one may 
undertake offering the service has been accompanied by both rate 
regulation and competition.90 Moreover the public objective of 
avoiding the expense of unnecessary duplication of facilities clearly 
distinguishes any grant of exclusivity from the unregulated one 
granted by the patent laws and clearly justifies the issuance of the 
certificate of public convenience and necessity under the Com­
merce Clause, while affirmative rate regulation avoids the abuse 
the limitations of the Patent Clause place upon the explicit power 
of Congress to authorize the issuance of exclusive quasi-property 
rights in the form, of patents for a limited time.91
Similarly, in the case of radio and television broadcasting the 
need to rationalize use of the limited radio spectrum to prevent 
interference and the licensing of competing broadcasters both justi­
fy the issuance of exclusive certificates to a portion of the spectrum 
for a limited time in order to make any use of the publicly owned 
airwaves at all.92 Licensing competing broadcasters avoids the 
abuses that the limitations of the Patent Clause were designed to 
prevent in the case of Congressional grants of exclusivity in 
writings and discoveries.93 The rights granted are not patent
87. Natural Gas Act of 1938, 17 U.S.C.A. § 717(a)-(f) (West 1976 & Supp. 1992).
88. Federal Power Act of 1936, 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)*© (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
89. The Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-58, 301-33 (West 1991).'
90. See SCHWARTZ, FLYNN &  FIRST, supra note 77, at 31-32.
91. For the rationales for rate regulation, see icL at 311-16.
92. See F.C.C. v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474 (1940). "Unless 
Congress had exercised its power over interstate commerce to bring about allocation of 
available frequencies and to regulate the employment of transmission equipment the re­
sult would have been an impairment of the effective use of these facilities by anyone." 
Id. .
93. See SCHWARTZ, FLYNN &  FIRST, supra note 77, at 34-35.
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rights—a government conferred and unregulated exclusive right 
to have others prevented from making, using or selling an idea or 
subject matter—but limited permission to make use of a public 
asset conferred by government for the benefit of the public in order 
to have any practical use of the radio spectrum at all and one 
controlled by competition from other licensees serving the same 
audience.
The nature of a "patent" right and the thin line between the 
creation of a patent right conferring an exclusive quasi-property 
right and other forms of regulated exclusivity not subject to the 
constitutional limits of the Patent Clause is perhaps best illustrat­
ed by cases dealing with the thorny issue of categorizing state law 
recognition of some realm of exclusivity over things of value and 
the patent laws. The Supreme Court has long held that the Patent 
Clause standing alone, like the dormant Commerce Clause and the 
patent laws, preempts state laws which create "patent-like" 
rights.94 The Court has held:
State law protection for techniques and designs whose 
disclosure has already been induced by market rewards may 
conflict with the very purpose of the patent laws by decreasing 
the range of ideas available as the building blocks of farther 
innovation.
. . . .  [0]ur past decisions have made clear that state regula­
tion of intellectual property must yield to the extent that it 
clashes with the balance struck by Congress in our patent 
laws. . . . Where the public has paid the congressionally 
mandated price for disclosure, the States may not render the 
exchange fruitless by offering patent-like protection to the 
subject matter of the expired patent.95
The key issue in such cases is when does a state law create a 
"patent-like" right as opposed to some other type of right like a 
tort or contract right? Identification of the factors relied upon in 
these cases is an additional guide in determining whether the 
Orphan Drug Act creates patent-like rights subject to the limita­
94. See Coats v. Merrick Thread Co., 149 U.S. 562, 572 (1893); Kellogg Co. v. 
National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. I l l ,  117 (1938); Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 
169, 203-04 (1898); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,151-57
(1991).
95. Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 151-52.
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tions upon Congress’s power to do so under the Patent Clause.96
In Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,97 and Compco Corp. 
v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.98 the Court was confronted with cases 
requiring the Court to determine whether state laws of unfair 
competition created a form of property rights the equivalent of 
patent rights within the exclusive power of Congress to create or 
not create under the Patent Clause of the Constitution. In the 
Sears case the lower courts found that Stiffel’s claim to a patent 
on the design of pole lamps was invalid due to anticipation in the 
prior art, but enjoined Sears from further sale of the lamps on a 
finding of consumer confusion under the Illinois law of unfair 
competition. The latter finding was based on the conclusion that 
the Illinois law of unfair competition prohibited product simulation 
even in the absence of evidence that the defendant took some 
additional steps beyond copying the design of the product to induce 
consumer confusion like the affirmative act of mislabeling the 
lamps. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was a 
right under the federal patent laws to copy the lamp design and 
sell identical lamps to the public. The Court held that the grant of 
a patent "is the grant of a statutory monopoly"99 and that state 
law may not be permitted to create a similar monopoly.100 State 
law may
in appropriate circumstances, require that goods, whether 
patented or unpatented, be labeled or that other precautionary 
steps be taken to prevent customers from being misled as to 
the source, just as it may protect businesses in the use of their 
trademarks, labels or distinctive dress in the packaging of 
goods so as to prevent others, by imitating such markings, 
from misleading purchasers as to the source of the goods.101
96. See generally Stephen L. Carter, Owning Wkat Doesn't Exist, 13 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POLICY 99, 114-18 (1990) (criticizing Bonito Boats decision).
97. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
98. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
99. 376 U.S. at 229.
100. Id  at 231-32. To allow a state to use its law of unfair competition to prevent 
the copying of an article which represents too slight an advance to be patented would be 
to permit the state to block off from the public something which the federal law has said 
belongs to the public. See id
101. Id  at 232 (footnote omitted).
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The Court drew the distinction between state unfair trade 
practices law and a patent right at that point where state law 
crosses the line of protecting consumers from confusion to the 
creation of an exclusive property right whereby government ex­
cludes others and protects the claimant of the right from copying 
or vending the idea or subject matter by others without regard for 
consumer confusion and less restrictive means for preventing 
consumer confusion.102
The Court reached a similar conclusion in Compco, a case 
involving the copying of the functional aspects of an unpatented 
fluorescent lighting system. The Court held that the granting of an 
injunction against copying of an unpatented article, freely 
available to the public, even where there is some evidence of 
confusion, unconstitutionally "interfere[d] with the federal policy 
found in Art. 1, cl. 8 of the Constitution and in the implementing 
federal statutes, of whatever the federal patent and copyright laws 
leave in the public domain."103 The Court further held that 
whatever is left in the public domain by federal patent law, "can 
be copied in every detail by whoever pleases."104
The Court was careful to draw a line permitting the states to 
have laws preventing active consumer deception by regulating 
conduct like mislabeling or unauthorized use of trademarks—laws 
which are designed not to create an exclusive property right in the 
holder of the trade dress or mark, but laws designed to protect 
consumers by preventing activity designed to mislead or defraud 
consumers.105 Such laws are premised upon tort concepts and 
create duties to avoid fraud or misrepresentation; duties imposed 
by law to protect the public and not laws vesting a property-like 
right to exclude. The primary thrust of valid state laws regulating 
unfair competition is not the creation of property rights in the 
mark or product dress which would be rights belonging to the
102. Id. at 231-33. In recent years there has been an expansion of the use of state 
law tort principles and doctrines like misappropriation to expand claims of a right of 
protection for otherwise unprotected intellectual "property" interests. The trend is 
extensively examined and thoughtfully evaluated in Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning 
Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 Va. L. REV. 149, 
150-70 (1992).
103. Id. at 237.
104. Id, at 238.
105. See also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Crafts Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 154-57
(1989).
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property owner to exclude others even in the absence of consumer 
deception. The objective of such laws is to protect consumers from 
fraudulent and misleading conduct unfairly inducing consumers to 
purchase products they believe to be from one source when 
products originate with another.
Similarly, in the case of trade secrets, the Court has held that 
state laws aimed at protecting information not in the public 
domain are designed to protect a confidential relationship and 
protect contractual rights of privacy and are not the creation of a 
property-like right to exclude others from an idea.106 The focus 
of the law in such cases is the recognition of both a contract and 
a tort right, relational rights designed to protect contractual 
relationships and enforce tort duties. Trade secret law is not 
designed to create a unilateral right to exclude others from an idea 
without more—the creation of a quasi-property right to exclude 
like the patent right. The underlying nature of trade secret rights 
as relational tort or contract rights and not property rights is 
clearly established by the uniform, recognition that the holder of a 
trade secret right is not protected from independent discovery of 
the idea or from independent reverse engineering uncovering the 
secret.107 The holder of a trade secret is protected only from 
tortious interference with rights of privacy or interference with 
contractual relationships requiring confidentiality and is not given 
an independent property-like right status to exclude all others 
from using the idea—the essence of the patent right.108
106. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 491-94 (1974).
107. "A trade secret. . .  does not offer protection against discovery by fair and honest 
means, such as independent invention, accidental disclosure, or by so-called reverse 
engineering . . . ." Id. at 476.
A trade secret may be a form of property interest for purposes of the Fifth 
Amendment’s prohibition upon a takings of "private property for public use without just 
compensation." See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,1002-04 (1984). The con­
cept of "property" for Fifth Amendment purposes embraces the takings of interests of 
value including such intangible interests as trade secrets, contract rights, Lynch v. 
United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934), and a lien interest. Armstrong v. United States, 
364 U.S. 40,45-46 (1960). The fact that a trade secret is "property" for Fifth Amendment 
purposes, of course, does not mean it is a property right for other purposes any more 
than a contract right becomes a property right for other purposes because it is considered 
"property" for Fifth Amendment purposes.
108. Justice Douglas correctly observed in his dissent in Kewanee:
A trade secret, unlike a patent, has no property dimension. That was the
view of the Court of Appeals. . .  and its decision is supported by what Mr.
Justice Holmes said in DuPont Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100,102:
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These cases therefore establish a relatively clear line defining 
patent-like rights as rights conferring upon an. individual or firm 
what are in essence government created and enforced quasi­
property rights to exclude others from making, using or vending 
an idea or subject matter, as distinguished from laws designed to 
protect contractual relations,109 prevent tortious conduct or pre­
vent consumer deception by deceitful mislabeling or misbranding 
of goods.110 As the Court noted in Bonito Boats:
"The word property as applied to trade-marks and trade 
secrets is an unanalyzed expression of certain secondary 
consequences of the primary fact that the law makes some 
rudimentary requirements of good faith. Whether the plain­
tiffs have any valuable secret or not the defendant knows the 
facts, whatever they are, through a special confidence that he 
accepted. The property may be denied but the confidence 
cannot be. Therefore the starting point for the present matter 
is not property or due process of law, but that the defendant 
stood in confidential relations with the plaintiffs, or one of 
them. These have given place to hostility, and the first thing 
to be made sure of is that the defendant shall not fraudulent­
ly abuse the trust reposed in him. It is the usual incident of 
confidential relations. If there is any disadvantage in the fact 
that he knew the plaintiff's secrets he must take the burden 
with the good."
A suit to redress theft of a trade secret is grounded in tort damages 
for breach of contract—a historic remedy. Damages for breach of a 
confidential relation are not pre-empted by this patent law, but an in­
junction against use is pre-empted because the patent law states the only 
monopoly over trade secrets that is enforceable by specific performance; and 
that monopoly exacts as a price full disclosure. A trade secret can be 
protected only by being kept secret. Damages for breach of a contract are 
one thing; an injunction barring disclosure does service for the protection 
accorded valid patents and is therefore pre-empted.
416 U.S. at 498-99 (citations omitted).
109. Misappropriation cases like International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 
U.S. 215 (1918) come closest to inferring the existence of a property right and committing 
the courts to protecting the right even though it does not conform to the limitations of 
the Patent Clause. Where such cases are viewed as unfair competition cases constraining 
conduct which destroys the value created by the plaintiff through tortious means 
however, they too can be distinguished from laws creating independent rights to exclude 
others from an idea without regard for the means adopted by others to destroy the idea 
or value. So defined, they are narrow find traditional tort cases, not cases involving the 
vesting by law of a property-like right to exclude. See James A. Rahl, The Right to 
Appropriate Trade Values, 23 O h io St. L.J. 56 passim (1962).
110. The courts have also carefully limited the scope of state contract doctrine in the 
case of licensee estoppel or the extent to which a patent owner’s licensing agreements 
are enforceable under state law where the underlying patent is invalid or the patent is 
being used to expand the scope of patent rights. The doctrine stems from the recognition 
that:
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The law of unfair competition has its roots in the 
common-law tort of deceit: its general concern is with protect­
ing consumers from confusion as to source. While that concern 
may result in the creation of "quasi-property rights" in 
communicative symbols, the focus is on the protection of 
consumers, not the protection of producers as an incentive to 
produce innovation.111
A relatively clear line of demarcation between patent rights 
and state law recognition of a need to protect consumers from 
deception and the protection of contractual interests like trade 
secret rights can therefore be drawn on the basis of who is the 
intended and primary beneficiary of the policy being enforced. 
Such laws are designed to protect the public and contracting 
parties, not to confer quasi-property rights for the benefit of the 
holder of the right to have all others excluded from making or 
using or vending some idea or subject matter—a patent right. 
They are laws designed to protect employers and competitors from 
tortious conduct or violations of contractual responsibil­
ities—common law matters within the jurisdiction of the 
states—and they are not the granting of independent property-like 
rights for the purpose of providing a profit incentive to encourage 
the disclosure of new inventions or to create independently
It is as important to the public that competition should not be repressed by . 
worthless patents, as that the patentee of a really valuable invention 
should be protected in his monopoly; and it is a serious question whether 
public policy permits a man to barter away beforehand his right to defend 
unjust actions or classes of actions, though, in an individual case, he may 
doubtless assent that a judgment be rendered against him, even without 
notice.
Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 234 (1892).
In Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 668 (1969), the Court framed the conflict of 
policies as one where "the law of contracts forbids a purchaser to repudiate his promises 
simply because he later becomes dissatisfied with the bargain he has made"; while 
"federal law requires that all ideas in general circulation be dedicated to the common 
good unless they are protected by a valid patent." Id. The Court held that federal patent 
policy required that licensees be given the right to challenge the validity of the patent 
in question and, where the patent is found invalid, state law may not be used to compel 
the licensee to pay accrued royalties for the invalid patent. The use of state law to force 
payment of royalties on a pending patent was upheld in Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil 
Co., because the Court treated the case as a contract case and that enforcement of the 
contract was similar to the enforcement of a trade secret license against a licensee even 
though the secret was subsequently disclosed. 440 U.S. 257, 264-64 (1979).
111. 489 U.S. at 157.
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enforceable property interests in ideas or subject matter in order 
to promote the progress of science and useful arts.
In neither the case of federal regulation of natural monopolies 
or state unfair competition law and trade secret law is there a 
conferring of a market exclusion right upon an inventor or an 
investor in order to stimulate either investment or the disclosure 
of new inventions. And, in neither case is there the conferring of 
an exclusive monopoly right free of rate regulation or competition 
to prevent the abuses of an otherwise unregulated monopoly power 
to fix prices, control production, determine quality, regulate the 
rate of innovation, and exercise an unlimited power to allocate 
resources. In no case can federal or state law confer an exclusive 
quasi-property monopoly right with the primary objective of 
stimulating investment other than the only form of quasi-property 
monopoly right Congress is delegated the limited power to create 
by the Patent Power: the power to stimulate disclosure of truly 
inventive new ideas to promote the progress of science and the 
useful arts. All other grants of such unregulated rights invite the 
abuses of sovereign-conferred exclusive grants the Statute of 
Monopolies inveighed against more than four centuries ago. 
Consequently, where an unregulated and exclusive quasi-property 
right to exclude others from making, using or vending an idea or 
subject matter is granted by state or federal governments, a patent 
right has been created. It is a right which may only be created 
pursuant to and in conformity with the Patent Power of the Constitution.112
112. The Supreme Court has stated:
The grant of a patent is the grant of a statutory monopoly; indeed, the 
grant of patents in England was an explicit exception to the state of James 
I [The Statute of Monopolies] prohibiting monopolies. Patents are not given 
as favors, as was the case of monopolies given by the Tudor monarchs, but 
are meant to encourage invention by rewarding the inventor with the right, 
limited to a term of years fixed by the patent, to exclude others from the 
use of his invention. During that period of time no one may make, use, or 
sell the patented product without the patentee's authority. But in re­
warding useful invention, the rights and welfare of the community must be 
fairly dealt with and effectually guarded. To that end the prerequisites to 
obtaining a patent are strictly observed, and when the patent has issued 
the limitations on its exercise are equally strictly enforced. To begin with, 
a genuine ‘invention’ or ‘discovery’ must demonstrated ‘less in the constant 
demand for new appliances the heavy hand of tribute be laid on each slight 
technological advance in the art.’ Once the patent issues, it is strictly 
construed, it cannot be used to secure any monopoly beyond that contained 
in the patent, the patentee’s control over the product when it leaves his
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C. The Orphan Drug Act Unconstitutionally 
Creates a Patent Right
The effect of the Orphan Drug Act certification process and 
grant of seven years of marketing exclusivity before other applica­
tions will be considered by the FDA is the governmental conferring 
of a statutory monopoly—a patent right or patent-like right to be 
the exclusive vendor of the drug for a particular designation for a 
limited time. The right is an absolute one because anyone seeking 
to distribute a drug must first secure FDA approval to do so, and 
the FDA is precluded from granting a similar right to any other 
applicant unless the holder of the existing exclusive right cannot 
assure sufficient quantities of the drug to meet the designated 
need or unless the certificate holder consents.113 The exclusive 
right granted is even stronger than the exclusive right to vend 
under the patent laws because the certificate holder need not be 
an inventor and need take no action to enforce the right; the FDA 
is required by law to enforce the right for them by virtue of being 
precluded from permitting the sale of the drug by anyone else for 
the designated orphan disease. And, the scope of the right granted 
is broader than that permitted by the patent laws, because the 
subject matter need not amount to a new invention, can embrace 
a product of nature not otherwise patentable, and can be an active 
ingredient which has been "previously explored in academic or 
scientific literature" and is therefore obvious or previously 
disclosed.114
Like the exclusive rights granted by patent law, the right 
conferred by the Orphan Drug Act is a right not conditioned upon 
some event like the recovery of the costs associated with develop­
ing the drug or the costs of securing FDA approval of sale of the 
drug. It is a right whereby the certificate holder is free to charge
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hand is sharply limited, and the patent monopoly may not be used in 
disregard of the antitrust laws. Finally, . . .  when the patent expires, the 
monopoly created by it expires too, and the right to make the prod­
uct—including the right to make it in precisely the shape it carried when 
patented—passes to the public.
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229-30 (1964) (footnotes & citations 
omitted).
113. 21 U.S.C. § 369cc(b) (1988).
114. Thomas, supra note 2, at 427.
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whatever the traffic will bear and it is a right not limited to the 
unique regulatory goals sought by Congress in adopting the 
Orphan Drug Act of only compensating for research and regulatory 
compliance costs. In the case of patent rights, an unencumbered 
right of exclusivity to make, use or vend the discovery for a limited 
time is considered a just trade-off in return for public disclosure of 
the patented idea in order to promote the primary purpose of the 
patent laws—the public benefit of the advancement of science and 
the useful arts by the disclosure of new discoveries and the placing 
of those ideas in the public domain to stimulate further research 
and innovation.115 In the case of the Orphan Drug Act there is 
no such public trade-off because the certificate holder gains an 
exclusive right to vend whether the idea is patentable or not; and, 
in the case of patented drugs designated Orphan Drugs, no new 
benefit is gained by the public in the form of the dedication of new 
discoveries to the public domain beyond that which is already in 
the public domain by virtue of the patent system.
As a result, there is growing evidence that the laudable public 
objectives of the Act in securing the investment and effort 
necessary to bring drugs to market for diseases effecting a 
relatively small number are being compromised by excessive 
profits being made by some certificate holders. It has been noted 
that:
jT]he Act is over-inclusive. The Act extends the benefits of 
orphan status to drugs that would be profitable without the 
incentives. Pharmaceutical companies have occasionally 
stayed within the letter but not the spirit of the law by taking 
advantage of the Act’s subsidies, producing drugs which would 
have been justifiable without subsidies despite their small 
market. Congress currently fears that in some instances, 
instead of stimulating innovation it has subsidized already 
profitable pharmaceutical ventures. Congress is therefore 
threatening to restrict the Act’s incentives by eliminating the 
vital market exclusivity provision.116
115. There is not universal agreement that the trade-off is just. See Tom G. Palmer, 
Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of Property Rights and 
Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817 passim (1990); Evan Mackay, Economic 
Incentives In Markets for Information and Innovation, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 867 
passim (1990).
116. Thomas, supra note 2, at 414 (footnotes omitted). Thomas believes that limiting
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The over inclusiveness of the Act is a direct result of the Act 
conferring what are in essence patent rights to charge whatever 
the traffic will bear. The Act does so in violation of the constitu­
tional limitations upon Congress’s limited power to confer patent 
rights out of the well grounded fear of the Founders that the 
unconfined grant of market exclusivity rights would result in 
monopoly profits and barriers to innovation without the conferring 
of the required public benefits of an otherwise constitutionally 
limited patent system.
It is apparent that the Orphan Drug Act cannot be analogized 
to state laws indirectly conferring a property like right as the 
result of enforcement of unfair competition prohibitions, contract 
rights or trade secret policies. The Act is a statute aimed at giving 
producers an incentive to produce by government both creating 
and conferring a quasi-property right to have others excluded from 
selling a drug for a period of seven years and is not a statute 
designed to protect confidential relationships or to protect 
consumers from deception or other forms of tortious conduct. It is 
a statute aimed at giving the certificate holder the financial 
incentives of a patent-like right; a quasi- property right to have 
others excluded for a limited time from selling a particular drug 
independent of any tort or contract concerns related to the subject 
matter. It does so through the licensing powers of the FDA by 
precluding the FDA, an agency which is otherwise supposed to 
license drugs found safe and efficacious for sale, from doing so 
where the drug is one certified as an "orphan drug." The limitation 
upon the FDA’s authority and prevention of competitive entry is 
not for some health or safety reason or even to protect confidential 
relationships or the public from fraud, but it is designed to 
stimulate research and production of drugs by the conferring of an 
exclusive monopoly right to vend for seven years.117 The Act
the exclusive right would "emasculate" the Act and raise barriers to new product 
development. Id. Her analysis does not consider the question of whether the grant of 
exclusivity is an unconstitutional grant of patent rights to begin with and whether there 
are other constitutional means to the end of encouraging development of Orphan Drugs 
not posing the risks of monopoly pricing and the other anticompetitive consequences the 
present Act invites.
117. The legislative history of the Act is replete with statements that the primary 
objective of the seven year exclusive right to vend a designated drug is to provide "an 
incentive to develop orphan drugs." See, e.g., Orphan Drug Act, H.R. REP. No. 97-840, 
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), reprinted in 128 CoNG. Rec. 2126 (Feb. 23, 1982) (remarks
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converts the FDA from an agency concerned with health and 
safety issues into a sub-office of the Patent Office and a sub-office 
without the expertise and responsibilities of the Patent Office to 
deny grants of an exclusive quasi-property right where the 
applicant is not an inventor and the subject matter does not 
represent a discovery advancing the progress of science and the 
useful arts.
Like the Patent Office, however, the FDA is not permitted to 
limit the life of exclusivity to a period sufficient to recapture 
research and regulatory costs in exchange for the conferring of an 
exclusive right. The period of exclusivity is set by law and bears 
no necessary relationship to the cost of research or the cost of 
complying with FDA testing and other requirements. What is 
conferred is a right of exclusivity bearing no relationship to costs 
of producing the drug. What is conferred is a patent right within 
the meaning of the Patent Clause of the Constitution, but one not 
conforming to the specific limitations upon the power of Congress 
to create patent rights.
To the extent the Act permits certificate holders who are not 
inventors to obtain the right from the FDA to have others 
excluded from vending a drug, whether the drug is patentable or 
not, the Act clearly violates the constitutional limitation upon 
granting patent rights to non-inventors.118 To the extent that the 
Orphan Drug Act permits the withdrawal from the public domain 
the full use of ideas previously in the public domain, it violates the 
constitutional limitation upon the creation of patent rights in ideas 
that are not new discoveries. And, to the extent that the Act both
of Sen. Kassenbaum: The Act "provides financial incentive for the development of orphan 
drugs in recognition of cost factors which currently discourage their production."); 128 
CONG. Rec . 25,440 (Sept. 28, 1982) (remarks of Rep. Waxman). No mention is made of 
limiting the "incentives" provided by the Act to obtaining the Progress of Science and 
Useful Arts by restricting the exclusive right granted, to new discoveries or to new 
discoveries by inventors.
The role of the pharmaceutical industry in the adoption of the Act has been 
described as "first one of disinterest and then one of opportunism." Richardson, supra 
note 1, at 158. The industry lobbying group opposed adoption of legislation to deal with 
the problem of orphan drugs and sought to use the occasion to seek a relaxation of FDA 
safety and efficacy regulations for all new drug applications. Id. at 158-59.
118. The limitation upon the grant of a patent to a non-inventor is explicit in the 
Constitution and has been a strictly enforced and consistent requirement of the patent 
laws. See supra note 56 (discussing Constitutional basis for limitations on grant of 
patent).
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deters and fails to promote progress in science and the useful arts 
by removing ideas from the public domain and restricting free 
access to and use of subject matter in the public domain, the Act 
directly conflicts with the basic public purpose behind the constitu­
tional grant of power to Congress to enact patent laws.
III. T he Creation  of Patent R ights By  a  L aw  Passed  
P ursuant to  the  Commerce Clause Is Unconstitutional 
W here the  A ct  Conflicts w ith  the  L imitations 
of the Patent Clause
The foregoing analysis, demonstrating that the Act creates a 
patent right within the meaning of the Patent Clause, raises a 
second fundamental and serious constitutional issue with respect 
to the Orphan Drug Act: whether Congress may adopt a statute 
creating patent rights under the commerce power in lieu of 
exercising its powers under the Patent Clause, where the rights 
created are not confined in a manner conforming to the limitations 
found in the Patent Clause. The logic of a negative answer to this 
issue is that the federal government is a government of limited 
powers; that Congress can only base its laws upon a specific power 
delegated to it; that the use of one power to enact a law within a 
different and limited grant of power may in some circumstances 
be an unconstitutional exercise of the delegated power; and, that 
the adoption of a law creating patent rights under the power to 
regulate commerce rather than the power to create a patent 
system is an unconstitutional exercise of the commerce power 
where the rights created do not conform with the limitations of the 
Patent Clause. If Congress were to use the commerce power 
through a bill originating in the Senate to, for example, appropri­
ate funds to support an army for four years and impose special 
taxes to finance the appropriation, the law would be unconstitu­
tional because it would violate the express limitation found in 
article 1, section 7, clause 1 upon revenue raising bills originating 
in the House of Representatives and the limitation found in article 
1, section 8, clause 12 limiting appropriations to support an army 
to a two year period. Even if the laws passed under the Commerce 
Clause generally conformed to the limitations on section 7, clause 
1 and section 8, clause 12 of article 1, it should be held that this
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misuse of the powers granted Congress holds such potential for 
abuse that attempts to do so are an unconstitutional exercise of 
the power granted, as well as an unwise practice for the Congress 
to adopt.119
A contrary argument must claim that the power to regulate 
commerce is a plenary power of Congress; one which can be 
exercised independent of the other clauses granting power to 
Congress and can be exercised in a way conflicting with the 
express limitations upon the other powers of Congress. One might 
argue for example, that the 1937 change in Supreme Court
119. Congress has been engaged in enacting a series of questionable patent-related 
laws or laws creating patent like rights under the Commerce Clause. For example, the 
Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2231-2583 (1988), grants an exclusive right for 
seventeen years to the owners of a new sexually reproduced plant. The Act provides a 
confused and vague explanation of the power exercised as follows:
It is the intent of Congress to provide the indicated protection for 
new varieties by exercise of any constitutional power needed for that end, 
so as to afford adequate encouragement for research and for marketing 
when appropriate to yield the public benefits of new varieties. Constitu­
tional clauses 3 [commerce clause] and 8 [patent clause] of Article 1, section 
8 are both relied upon.
7 U.S.C. § 2582 (1988).
The bill which resulted in this statute was not routed through the patent 
subcommittees of the Judiciary Committees or either house but was considered by the 
Agriculture Committees of both houses in order to circumvent opposition from Judiciary 
Committee members to the bill. Irons & Sears, supra note 65, at 675 n.91. The resulting 
Act’s standard of invention is constitutionally questionable; delegating administration 
of a law creating valuable patent rights for agri-business to the Department of Agri­
culture is of dubious wisdom at best; and, the uncertainty of which power of Congress 
is being exercised warrant serious reconsideration of the Act by Congress, if not by a 
court challenge to the validity of the Act because of the ambiguity concerning the level 
of invention required by the Act.
A similar confusion between the patent power and the Commerce Clause exists 
with regard to a 1985 amendment to the Orphan Drug Act permitting Orphan Drug 
status to be extended to patented drugs. See Pub. L. No. 99-91,99 Stat. 387 (1985) (ame­
nding 21 U.S.C. 301, 360 (1988)). The purpose of the amendment was to permit Orphan 
Drug status to be given patented drugs where patent protection was about to expire. 
House Energy and Commerce Committee, Orphan Drug Amendments of 1985, H. B. Rep. 
No. 99-153, reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 301. The amendment was passed pursuant 
to the commerce power as an amendment to the Orphan Drug Act and has the effect of 
expanding the grant of patent protection without the necessary conferring of the constitu­
tional benefit upon the public of some additional disclosure of a discovery promoting 
progress in science or the useful arts. The amendment is of questionable constitutional 
validity.
For these and other reasons, the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 387 (1984) (codified in scattered 
sections of Titles 21 & 35 of U.S.C.), apparently passed pursuant to both the Commerce 
and Patent Clauses, is of questionable constitutionality, as is the Cable Communications 
Policy Act of 1984. See Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2279; see also supra notes 26, 81.
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interpretation of the Constitution permitting a vast expansion of 
federal power under both the taxing120 and commerce pow­
ers121 was a response to the pragmatic need to have a national 
Congress and Executive branch jurisdictionally competent to 
handle national problems and free of any significant review by a 
non-elected, anti-democratic, and nay-saying judicial branch.122 
The shift in measuring commerce clause authority from a quanti­
tative measurement of the physical movement of commerce and 
the amount moving to a qualitative test of whether the subject 
matter regulated was a problem affecting more states than one, 
might lend credence to a claim that the commerce power includes 
the power to regulate problems affecting more states than one 
even where the regulation imposed is within a different and 
specific limited power of Congress and is imposed in a manner 
inconsistent with the limitations upon that specific power.123 The 
obvious consequence of such a holding would be to convert the 
federal government into one of unlimited powers and write out of 
the Constitution many of the specific limitations upon the powers 
of Congress and the President.124
120. Compare United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (holding "processing and 
floor taxes" unconstitutional) with Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) 
(upholding as constitutional social security tax on employees).
121. Compare Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (striking down federal 
laws protecting coal miners as beyond commerce power) with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin 
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding NLRA as valid exercise of federal commerce 
power) and Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. I l l  (1942) (upholding federal wheat quotas as 
legitimate exercise of Congress’ commerce power).
122. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 47-49 (1991) suggesting that the 1937 
"switch in one saving nine" amounted to a major revision of the Constitution—an 
amendment of the amending process—when the Court withdrew from extensive review 
of economic regulation and caused a constitutional transformation building new 
constitutional foundations for an activist national government. See generally TRIBE, 
supra note 58, at 560-86 (discussing evolution of Lochner era of finding implied 
limitations upon power of Congress and its general demise).
123. For an analysis of this type of argument, see TRIBE, supra note 58, ch.5.
124. It may very well be the case that the language of the Commerce Clause 
authorizes vast exercises of regulatory authority without the internal language of that 
clause limiting the commerce power as illustrated in cases like Wickard v. Filbum, 317 
U.S. I l l ,  118-29 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123-26 (1941); Perez v. 
United States, 402 U.S. 146, 153-57 (1971); and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 
303-05 (1964). However, restraints external to the language of the commerce power like 
the language of other sections and clauses of Article 1 of the Constitution and other 
articles and amendments to the Constitution should be and are effective constraints.
If, for example, Congress believed that state boundaries were outmoded and 
prevented effective economic regulation of the country, it could not use the commerce 
power to eliminate state boundaries and create 10 administrative units to govern local
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Research has failed to turn up any cases directly answering 
this question in the case of the use of the commerce clause to 
enact laws creating patent rights.125 One might argue that the 
Trademark Cases126 establish the power to enact laws creating 
intellectual property-like rights under the Commerce Clause 
independent of the power to do so under the Patent Clause. A - 
careful reading of the Trademark Cases indicates that they 
establish no such proposition. In those cases, individuals had been 
indicted under a criminal statute enacted by Congress making it 
a crime for persons knowingly and with an intent to defraud to 
make or use a trademark duly recorded and registered with the 
United States Patent Office. Those charged with violating the 
statute defended on the ground that the statutes were unconstitu­
tional because it was not within a delegated power of Congress or 
necessary and proper for the carrying out of a delegated power to 
enact such a statute. The prosecutors pointed to two powers of 
Congress, the Patent Clause and the Commerce Clause, as 
sufficient warrant to uphold the statute.
The Court rejected the claim that the Patent Clause was a 
sufficient basis for the statute because the essential characteristics 
of a trademark were not those of inventions or discoveries or the 
writings of authors. Instead, the Court held that a trademark is 
a distinctive symbol created by state law and its protection "grows 
out of its use, not its mere adoption."127 Consequently, the Court
affairs without running afoul of Article IV, § 4, which provides: "No new States shall be 
formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State . . . without the consent of 
the Legislatures of the States concerned . . . U.S. CONST, art. IV, § 4. By the same 
token, an even stronger argument can be made that limitations upon powers found 
within the same article and section of the Constitution as the Commerce Clause cannot 
be overridden by the exercise of the commerce power without doing great damage to the 
obvious intent of the Framers and ignoring every rule of construction on the books. For 
example, if Congress concluded the Supreme Court was undermining its regulatory 
policy by interpreting statutes with a simple-minded reliance upon naive neo-classical 
economic analysis, Congress could not use the commerce power to create a super 
supreme court with jurisdiction over the Supreme Court established by Article III in 
regulatory matters without violating Article III and the limited power provided by Article 
I, § 8, cl. 9 vesting power in Congress "to constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme 
Court." U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 9. (emphasis added).
125. See also MELVIN B. NlMMER, NlMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.09 (1991) (stating there 
are no cases on point of whether Congress may enact copyright legislation under 
Commerce Clause, although some cases in dictum have "averted to such a possibility").
126. United States v. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
127. i ’d  at 94.
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concluded it would not be a valid exercise of the power conferred 
by the Patent Clause to use it to create trademark rights: "While 
such legislation may be a judicious aid to the common law on the 
subject of trade-marks and may be within the competency of 
legislatures whose general powers embrace that class of subjects, 
we are unable to see any such power in the constitutional 
provision concerning authors and inventors, and their writings and 
discoveries."128 The implicit decision made is that it is an uncon­
stitutional exercise of the Patent Clause to enact legislation 
creating property-like rights to exclude all others where the law 
enacted does not conform to the limitations of the. Patent 
Clause.129
With respect to the commerce power, the Court deferred from 
drawing a general conclusion on the question of whether the 
statute was a valid exercise of that power out of deference to a co­
equal branch of government. Instead of deciding whether Congress 
could use the Commerce Clause to create patent-like rights, the 
Court assessed the issue of whether the statute was a valid 
exercise of the limited power of Congress to regulate that com­
merce which is interstate or with foreign nations or with the 
Indian tribes. The court found no such limitation in the statute, 
nor any allegation in the indictments that the defendants were 
engaged in misusing registered trademarks in interstate com­
merce. Consequently, the Court held the statute exceeded the
128. Id.
129. Similarly, longstanding proposals to create a form of intellectual property 
protection for industrial designs, like pending proposals by automobile manufacturers 
to restrict copying of replacement parts, are clearly unconstitutional. See, e.g., The 
Design Innovation and Technology Act of 1991, H.R. 1790,102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991);
H.R. 3499, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (pending legislation to restrict duplication of 
automobile parts). Such proposals create an exclusive right in a functional design for a 
period of years and do not rise up to the level of being an "invention" or something con­
tributing to the progress of science and the useful arts. The bill creates an exclusive ten 
year monopoly not conforming to the requirements of the Patent Clause.
An argument in support of this kind of legislation is that copiers are engaged in 
a form of "free riding," a simple minded cliche often encountered in antitrust cases that 
is a surrogate for creating or expanding property rights in ideas or subject matter beyond 
the limits of the Patent Clause in the name of "fairness" or "efficiency." The Trademark 
Cases and the Patent Clause stand in the way of such legislation, as does the general 
proposition that copying is often the expression of legitimate competition which should 
be protected rather than suppressed, particularly through the use of meaningless cliches 
like "free rider." See John J. Flynn, Antitrust Policy and the Concept o f a Competitive 
Process, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 893, 907 n.42 (1990).
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commerce power and declared the statute unconstitutional.
It is clear that the Court did not address the question of 
whether Congress could adopt legislation under the Commerce 
Clause which Congress was precluded from adopting under the 
Patent Clause, but simply assumed that if the statute was passed 
pursuant to the Commerce Clause as a means for preventing the 
misappropriation of state-created trademark rights, the congressio­
nal power to do so must be limited to misappropriations occurring 
in interstate commerce. A more modem approach would hold that 
the protection of trademarks from misappropriation is not the 
creation of a patent-like right or a property right because the 
purpose of trademark protection is the public one of preventing the 
public from being deceived or misled in the uses made of a 
trademark. State laws creating such rights and a federal law 
regulating their use in interstate commerce are not, therefore, the 
creation of patent-like rights vesting a property right in the holder 
of the mark, but are consumer protection laws designed to prevent 
deception. Hie Lanham Act clearly states as its purpose the 
"making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks" in 
commerce and the prevention of "fraud and deception" by the use 
or "reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations of 
registered marks."130 Consequently, the Lanham Act does not 
create a patent-like interest for mark holders since it only 
regulates the misuse of trademarks in interstate commerce in 
ways which deceive consumers.
The only other analogous case which might be relied upon to 
claim that Congress can use one clause of the Constitution to 
enact legislation it is expressly authorized by another clause to 
adopt, is Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States.131 In that 
case a constitutional challenge was mounted to Title II of the Civil 
Rights Act prohibiting racial discrimination in public accommoda­
tions132 by a hotel following the practice of refusing to rent rooms 
to blacks. One aspect of the challenge claimed that the statute 
exceeded the commerce powers of the federal government. 
Congress had passed the Act pursuant to both the Commerce 
Clause and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment authorizing
130. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988).
131. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
132. Id. at 242-43; see 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000 (West 1981 & Supp. 1991).
HeinOnline -- 1992 Utah L. Rev. 434 1992
No. 2] ORPHAN DRUG ACT 435
Congress to pass laws implementing that Amendment.133 Even 
though there was an express delegation of power to enact the 
legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court upheld 
the law as a valid exercise of the commerce power, stating:
[T]he determinative test of the exercise of power by the 
Congress under the Commerce Clause is simply whether the 
activity sought to be regulated is ‘commerce which concerns 
more States than one’ and has a real and substantial relation 
to the national interest.134
While one may see an inference in this decision that Congress 
can regulate anything which involves commerce concerning more 
states than one, even though it has express power to regulate the 
conduct under some other clause of the Constitution, it is clear 
that this case does not address the problem presented by the use 
of the Commerce Clause to circumvent the limitations of an 
express power authorizing the law enacted. The Fourteenth 
Amendment amends the basic document and should be read as 
expanding the scope of the general commerce power in cases 
dealing with racial segregation by providing an expanded basis for 
regulating the practice, particularly to limit state action authoriz­
ing or requiring racial segregation. As such, it is consistent with 
and expands the power granted Congress to regulate commerce by 
proscribing racial discrimination by state action as well as part of 
Congress’ power to regulate private economic conduct involving 
commerce and is not a limitation upon or inconsistent with the 
commerce power which it amends.
Unlike the Fourteenth Amendment authorization for 
Congress to enact laws implementing the Amendment and 
expanding the basic powers of Congress found in Article 1, the 
Patent Clause is a carefully crafted clause limiting the scope of all 
the powers granted by Article 1, section 8 in light of prior 
experience with grants of unlimited monopoly power by govern­
ment. As noted earlier, the limitations upon the power to enact 
patent legislation include a basic understanding that the purpose
133. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 5 provides: "The Congress shall have power to 
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
134. Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 356.
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of patent legislation must be the public one of advancing science 
and the useful arts by the disclosure of new inventions by 
inventors in exchange for a right to exclude others for a limited 
time. The public purpose of achieving disclosure is primary and 
the private right to exclude is subsidiary and tolerated to the 
extent necessary to induce the disclosure of new and inventive 
ideas. The Orphan Drug Act requires no such exchange, whether 
the drug is patented, patentable or not patentable; whether the 
drug is in the public domain or not; and, whether the applicant is 
an inventor or not. Moreover, the right of excluding others is made 
primary in order to achieve the secondary objective of inducing re­
search and the expense of complying with FDA regulation to 
secure the vending of drugs for orphan diseases—not to obtain 
disclosure of a new discovery.
To permit Congress to escape the limitations of the Patent 
Clause by relying upon the Commerce Clause to enact legislation 
creating patent rights undermines the basic policy of the Patent 
Clause, makes the Patent Clause a dead letter as a constraint 
upon the power of Congress to create patent rights, and violates 
the canon of constitutional and statutory construction expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius,135 It is a basic rule of construction 
recognized ever since Marbury v. Madison held that the Congress 
was without power to use the delegation of power to Congress to 
define the appellate jurisdiction of inferior courts to amend the 
express delegation of limited original jurisdiction to the Supreme 
Court.136 In Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the 
legislature, to apportion the judicial power between the 
supreme and inferior courts, according to the will of that body, 
it would certainly have been useless to have proceeded further 
than to have defined the judicial power, and the tribunals in 
which it should be vested. The subsequent part of the section 
is mere surplusage—is entirely without meaning, if such is to 
be the construction. If congress remains at liberty to give this 
court appellate jurisdiction, where the constitution has 
declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and original 
jurisdiction where the constitution has declared it shall be
135. "Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another."
136. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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appellate; the distribution of jurisdiction, made in the consti­
tution, is form without substance.
It cannot be presumed, that any clause in the constitu­
tion is intended to be without effect; and therefore, such a 
construction is inadmissable, unless the words require it.137
The explanation for the paucity of cases on the question of 
whether Congress may use one power to circumvent limits of 
another is that Congress has usually been careful about doing so 
ever since Marbury v. Madison. When complex issues of intellectu­
al property protection are raised, Congress has usually—but not 
always—shown extreme care in sorting out the constitutional basis 
for its actions. A recent example is the Semiconductor Chip 
Protection Act of 1984,138 a carefully crafted statute designed to 
deal with the difficult issues surrounding the protection of new 
forms of complex technology.139 Congress demonstrated extreme
137. Id. at 174. In upholding the authority of the Court to declare the law 
unconstitutional, Marshall went on to observe:
The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits 
may not be mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is written. To what 
, purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation com­
mitted to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those 
intended to be restrained? The distinction between a government with 
limited and unlimited powers is abolished, if those limits do not confine the 
persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed, 
are of equal obligation. It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the 
constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or that the 
legislature may alter the constitution by an ordinary act..
Between these alternatives, there is no middle ground. The 
constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary 
means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, 
is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it. If the former part 
of the alternative be true, then a legislative act, contrary to the constitu­
tion, is not law; if the latter part be true, then written constitutions are 
absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power, in its own 
nature, illimitable.
Certainly, all those who have framed written constitutions contem­
plate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, 
and consequently, the theory of every such government must be, that an act 
of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void.
Id  at 176.
138. 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14 (1988 & Supp. I I 1990).
139. Similar problems exist regarding other new technologies like the protection of 
computer software even though the Court has upheld patentability where the invention 
claimed covers a process which is broader than the simple reliance upon or implementa­
tion of an algorithm. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). See generally Daniel G. 
Feder, Comment, Computer Software: Hybrid Technology Demanding A Unique
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care in exercising its power under the Patent Clause to enact 
copyright legislation by limiting the protection to "mask works," or 
the things which embody the design of the semiconductor chip and 
not the chip itself. Doing so avoided the difficulty of violating a 
fundamental tenet of copyright law that a copyright does not 
protect useful or utilitarian articles standing alone, but can only 
protect the nonfunctional aspects of their design, and the further 
difficulty of whether the chip itself would constitute a writing.140 
Congress was also careful to use its commerce power to protect 
against the piracy of mask works in or affecting commerce141 in 
the event a mask work was found not to be a writing.142 This 
careful specification of the powers being exercised and the 
limitation of the use of the power in conformity with the restric­
tions placed upon the power by the Constitution suggest that 
Congress is well aware of the constitutional difficulties with pass­
ing a law creating patent rights under the Commerce Clause or in 
attempting to use the general commerce power to circumvent the 
limitations of the patent power when these issues are raised in the 
course of the legislative process.143
Unlike the ambiguous use of multiple powers of Congress in 
the Trademark Cases and reliance upon an amendment to the 
basic powers of Congress in the Heart of Atlanta Motel case, 
adoption of the Orphan Drug Act was clearly done pursuant to the 
power to regulate commerce and not pursuant to the Patent 
Clause or a subsequent amendment to the Constitution. Moreover, 
the circumstances of the Act’s adoption clearly involve an instance
Combination o f Copyright and Patent Protection, 59 UMKC L. REV. 1037,1059-74 (1991). 
Similar complex issues are arising in the patentability of the product of biotechnology 
and genetics research. See Kevin W. O’Connor, Patenting Animals and Other Living 
Things, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 597 (1991).
140. Seegenerally Robert W.Kastenmeier&Michael J. Remington, The Semiconduc­
tor Chip Protection Act o f1984: A Swamp or Firm Ground, 70 MINN. L. REV. 417 passim 
(1985). For a thoughtful exploration of the practical implications of the Act, see Leo J. 
Raskind, Reverse Engineering, Unfair Competition, and Fair Use, 70 MlNN. L. REV. 385, 
390-415 (1985).
141. 17 U.S.C. § 910 (1988).
142. See Kastenmeier & Remington, supra note 140, at 420-21.
143. Issues which should be raised with regard to obviously questionable proposals 
like the pending Design Innovation and Technology Act of 1991, H.R. 179, 102d Cong., 
1st Sess. (1991), a bill proposing to create 10 years of exclusive protection for "original 
designs of useful products" and not conforming to the limitations of the Patent Clause. 
See supra note 129 (discussing Design Innovation and Technology Act and its Patent 
Clause limitations).
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where the power granted Congress to confer patent rights—the 
Patent Clause—and being circumvented by reliance on the 
Commerce Clause to pass the Act. As noted above, the Act violates 
the express limitations found in the Patent Clause because: The 
grant of exclusivity conferred by the FDA under the Orphan Drug 
Act is not limited to inventors; the grant of exclusivity is not for 
the progress of science and the useful arts; the grant of exclusivity 
need not involve the disclosure of anything not already in the 
public domain; and, the grant of exclusivity need not rise up to the 
level of being a new discovery in order to receive a monopoly seven 
year right to be the exclusive vendor of the designated drug. , 
Consequently, there is a serious and substantial likelihood 
that a court will hold that in the case of powers granted to 
Congress under article 1, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution, 
the Congress may not use one power to enact legislation specifical­
ly authorized by another where there is a potential that such a 
practice will result in violating restrictions on the use of the 
specific granted power. This is the underlying holding of the 
Supreme Court in Railway Labor Executives Ass’n v. Gibbons,144 
where the Court struck down a special bankruptcy statute because 
it lacked the "uniformity1 required of bankruptcy laws found in the 
grant of the power to enact bankruptcy laws in article I, section 8, 
clause 4 of the Constitution.145 The Court held:
We do not understand either appellant or the United 
States to argue that Congress may enact bankruptcy laws 
pursuant to its power under the Commerce Clause. Unlike the 
Commerce Clause, the Bankruptcy Clause itself contains an 
affirmative limitation or restriction upon Congress’ power: 
bankruptcy laws must be uniform throughout the United 
States. Such uniformity in the applicability of legislation is
144. 455 U.S. 457 (1982).
145. Id. at 468-73. A preliminary issue in the case was whether the sections of the 
statute in question, labor protection provisions for employees laid off as the result of the 
bankruptcy of the Rock Island Railroad, were an exercise of the bankruptcy power or the 
commerce power. Id. at 465-68. Because the Act provided for the sums to be paid 
displaced employees to come from the bankrupt estate and gave priority to employee 
claims, the Court held the Act to be an exercise of the bankruptcy power. Id. Similarly, 
in the case of the Orphan Drug Act, it must first be determined whether the seven years 
market exclusivity right is the creation of a "patent right." The prior analysis of this 
Article clearly establishes that the seven year right of exclusivity conferred by the Act 
is a "patent right."
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not required by the Commerce Clause. Thus, if we were to 
hold that Congress had the power to enact non-uniform 
bankruptcy laws pursuant to the Commerce Clause, we would 
eradicate from the Constitution a limitation on the power of 
Congress to enact bankruptcy laws.146
This dicta reiterates the policy Justice Marshall enunciated 
in Marbury v. Madison: Congress may not enact a law under one 
clause of the Constitution where that law falls within another 
power of Congress and where the other power of Congress contains 
express limitations not found in the power being exercised. This is 
clearly the case with the Orphan Drug Act since the right created 
is a patent right permitting unregulated returns during the period 
of exclusivity and it is not carefully crafted to limit the award 
granted to the incentives found necessary: recovery of the research 
and FDA application costs plus a reasonable profit.147 The exclu­
sive seven year right granted is an unlimited one, a right to 
charge what the traffic will bear with no corresponding conferring 
of a public benefit of advancing the progress of science and the 
useful arts by the disclosure of a new invention and no necessary 
relation to reducing the barriers to orphan drug development. The 
Act creates a right which can be and is often conferred upon non­
inventors. What Congress is specifically prohibited from doing by 
one clause of the Constitution it should not, and likely will not, be 
permitted to do by another and more general grant of power.
It might also be a plausible argument to claim that even if 
the Act did conform to the limitations of the Patent Clause, it 
should be declared an unconstitutional exercise of the Commerce
146. Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 468 -69 (citations omitted).
147. The Orphan Drug Act’s other incentives are designed to aid in recoupment of 
development costs. They appear to be valid exercises of the taxing and spending powers. 
They include a streamlining of FDA approval process by permitting a request of the FDA 
for written recommendations for clinical and non-clinical tests necessary for approval (21 
U.S.C. § 360aa(a) (1988)); tax breaks for expenses related to orphan drug development 
(26 U.S.C. §§ 44H, 280C (1988)); FDA funding for assisting in the clinical testing 
necessary for approval of an orphan drug (21 U.S.C. § 360ee(a) (1988)); and, the creation 
of the Orphan Products Board to coordinate public and private development efforts (42 
U.S.C. § 236 (1988)). Adding an unregulated and exclusive seven year right to have all 
other sellers excluded, with the obvious invitation to engage in monopoly pricing, would 
appear to be more than frosting on the cake. It is the grant of a right unrelated to the 
specific limitations hindering orphan drug development—research costs, development 
costs, and the costs of complying with FDA regulations compensated for by the other 
incentives provided by the Act.
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Clause to use the power to enact laws within the express grant of 
power conferred by the Patent Clause. A reasoned construction of 
the Constitution, one consistent with rules of construction and 
Marbury, the nature of delegated powers, and the obvious intent 
of the Framers, is that a specific grant of power ought not be 
subsumed under a general grant of power. To do so would violate 
the obvious intent of the Framers to treat the matters as distinct 
and hold the potential for too much mischief like leaving the 
power being exercised vague and ambiguous. Such a practice, one 
apparently followed in the Trademark Cases, the Railway Labor 
case, and statutes like The Plant Variety Protection Act,148 
would require the courts to guess which power Congress intended 
to exercise and then to sort out those circumstances in which the 
specific grant of power ought and ought not be subsumed under 
the general grant of power. Moreover, such a construction would 
violate the basic principle that the federal government is a 
government of limited powers and can only act pursuant to the 
specific powers granted. By holding Congress must act only 
pursuant to a specific power which Congress initially selects and 
that it must be the power authorizing the exercise of the power 
being exercised, courts would place the responsibility on Congress 
to identify the power it has invoked and insure that Congress 
considers carefully the legitimacy of the law it proposes to enact. 
Doing so would also insure that the proposal is subject to scrutiny 
by the appropriate committees of Congress where issues of 
constitutional limitations upon the exercise of the power would 
more likely be carefully considered.
This is a responsibility Congress has generally assumed and 
usually exercised by specifically designating the power it is relying 
upon when enacting a law rather than leaving it to the courts to 
sort out later whether Congress exercised a power granted to it, 
which one did it exercise, and whether the exercise is an appropri­
ate use of the power the courts guess Congress relied upon. It is 
for these reasons that it is at least a plausible argument that a 
court could find the use of the commerce power to enact a law 
which creates rights within the Patent Clause is unconstitutional 
and strike the law down even if the law did conform generally 
with the more restrictive limitations of the Patent Clause. The
148. See supra note 119 (discussing Plant Variety Protection Act).
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argument is conclusive in light of Marbury and the Railway Labor 
Executives case, where the law adopted pursuant to the commerce 
clause creating patent rights does so in a manner which conflicts 
with the inherent limitations upon the powers of Congress to enact 
patent laws imposed by the Patent Clause, as is clearly the case 
with the Orphan Drug Act.
IV. C o n clu s io n
Congress must give careful consideration to the nature of the 
exclusive right that is created by the Orphan Drug Act and restrict 
the Act in a way which links and limits the right of exclusivity to 
the incentives Congress recognized as necessary to induce research 
and recover the expense of complying with FDA registration of 
new drugs. The incentive currently authorized is an exclusive and 
unregulated one for a seven year period and is resulting in 
monopoly pricing for several drugs; pricing unrelated to the costs 
of research and complying with FDA registration and testing 
requirements. It has all the characteristics of a patent right and 
not that of a narrowly drawn subsidy to induce the bringing of 
Orphan Drugs to market in light of and limited by the costs of 
research and compliance with regulatory requirements to insure 
the safety and efficacy of the drug. Existing subsidies for research 
and clinical testing go far in reducing entry barriers to the 
development and marketing of drugs for rare diseases. Adding a 
patent right of market exclusivity for seven years allows those 
obtaining the right to go well beyond recouping research, develop­
ment, and regulatory compliance costs. When coupled with the 
possibility of obtaining independent patent protection for truly new 
discoveries or an exclusive license to government developed or 
financed patent rights, the shower of public benefits granted drug 
manufacturers becomes an unnecessary and excessive embarrass­
ment of riches.
Few would contest the merit of government seeking ways to 
stimulate research and development of drugs to treat rare or 
uncommon diseases where the market incentives for private firms 
to do so are inadequate. But the methods by which government 
chooses to do so are subject to constitutional constraints as well as
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common sense ones; constraints which are based "upon a history 
and experience with abuses of methods barred by limitations 
expressly placed upon the powers of Congress to create exclusive 
and unregulated monopoly rights. Granting an exclusive seven 
year unregulated right to vend a product in order to provide an 
incentive to research and develop orphan drugs, violates the long 
history and experience with governmental grants of monopolies 
and the specific limitations placed upon the power to do so by the 
Patent Clause of the Constitution. Had Congress considered or 
been confronted with these limitations when it originally adopted 
the Act, it is likely that other and constitutional means would 
have been adopted to achieve the end and avoid the predictable 
abuses now plaguing the Act.
The present means of conferring a seven year exclusive and 
unregulated monopoly over vending a drug is a form of discredited 
1980s trickle down economic theory—that the beneficiary of the 
monopoly will be benevolent and exercise the monopoly in a non- 
explojtative manner for the benefit of victims of rare diseases. But 
the long history of unregulated monopolies should have at least 
taught us not to trust the benevolence of a monopolist,149 partic­
ularly one granted an unregulated monopoly by government— a 
monopoly enforced by government. There is now considerable 
evidence that the exclusive and unregulated monopolies conferred 
by the Orphan Drug Act are being abused, particularly by
149. Adam Smith's famous statement in The Wealth o f Nations: "It is not from the 
benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from 
their regard to their own interest" is a recognition that self-interest is the most powerful 
incentive to inducing someone to bring goods to the market. ADAM SMITH, An INQUIRY 
In t o  t h e  N atu r e  a n d  C au se s  o f  t h e  W e a lth  o p  N a t io n s  7 (Great Books 1952). Smith 
also recognized that self interest causes great injury to the common good in the case of 
the grant of a monopoly because it results "upon every occasion [in] the highest price 
which can be got," id. at 26, and that "[m]onopoly . . .  is a great enemy to good 
management. . . . "  Id. at 63. Smith saw a justification for a narrow and limited grant 
of monopolies for a short time by the sovereign for establishing a new trade in "some 
remote and barbarous nation" and for a limited monopoly for a short time for the 
inventor of "a new machine" and for a "new book to its author." Id. at 329. The grant of 
monopolies otherwise results in '
all other subjects of the state [being] taxed very absurdly in two different 
ways: first, by the high price of goods, which, in the case of a free trade 
they could buy much cheaper; and, secondly by their total exclusion from 
a branch of business which is might be both convenient and profitable for 
many of them to carry on.
Id  at 329.
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monopoly pricing practices exploiting the most vulnerable among 
us and the intended beneficiaries of the Act—victims of relatively 
rare diseases. Excluding competition in providing orphan drugs 
not only results in unjustified monopoly pricing, but likely deprives 
the intended beneficiaries from further innovation in providing the 
drug, improving the drug and its manufacture and in expanding 
research into additional and different treatment of the disease. 
Monopoly pricing imposes a tax on the victims of rare diseases to 
achieve what should be a public obligation of society to provide 
safe and efficacious drugs to treat rare illnesses as well as 
common ones.
Congress must therefore, reassess the unconstitutional grant 
of exclusivity by, for example, providing for termination of 
exclusivity once research and other costs plus a reasonable profit 
are recovered within the seven year period or once a certain level 
of return is realized from sales of the drug.150 Such steps would 
tend to shift the right granted by the Act from a private patent­
like exclusive right to sell to one akin to the public right of 
exclusivity given natural monopolies and subjected to affirmative 
rate regulation. In effect, it would be rate regulation in the form 
of a crude rate cap. While these forms of limitations upon the 
scope of the monopoly right granted may tend to shift the right 
granted from out of the realm of a patent right, the Act will still 
remain vulnerable both to a growing public concern over the 
monopoly prices charged for some orphan drugs and a constitu­
tional challenge to the ability of Congress to enact a law which 
goes beyond granting a perhaps legitimate regulatory incentive 
and creates what are in essence exclusive property rights without 
complying with the limitations of the Patent Clause. Although still 
subject to constitutional question, such proposals are at least a 
step in the right direction.
Another option is to make the subsidy for research on orphan 
illnesses direct, rather than indirect, by affirmatively expanding
150. See S. 2060, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (proposing to open consideration of 
new applications for sale of the designated drug once cumulative net sales reach $150 
million and to terminate exclusivity and authorize competing sales where cumulative net 
sales reach $200 million). H.R. 5421, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), proposed the 
imposition of an excess profits tax once the gross revenues from sales during the taxable 
year reached 125% of the sum of the cost of producing the drug sold during the year and 
marketing costs.
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funding out of general revenues for research on specific rare 
illnesses. Such an approach avoids the difficulty of delegating an 
unlimited taxing power for seven years to the holder of an orphan 
drug license; a taxing power which can be unfairly imposed on 
those suffering the illness, and a power which can be used to 
realize returns far in excess of the research and licensing costs 
incurred without any guarantee that the monopoly profits realized 
will be wisely re-invested in further research or be re-invested at 
all. This approach may suffer however from the on-going abuse of 
granting exclusive licenses on government funded research to 
private parties, a method of circumventing the general policy 
prohibiting the government grant of an exclusive monopoly right 
without an additional disclosure of a new discovery by the 
beneficiary of the grant.
An option avoiding the limitations of both placing a crude 
rate cap on profits and expanding government control over 
research funding might be to mandate compulsory licensing of all 
exclusive rights over drugs—those conferred by patent law, govern­
ment licensing of government owned patents or statutes like the 
Orphan Drug Act conferring an unconstitutional patent right. 
Drug prices in other nations are lower than in the United States 
because of the availability of compulsory licensing.151 It has even 
been suggested that the problem of excessive drug prices for 
patented drugs generally be dealt with by invoking the power of 
the federal government to condemn existing patent rights accom­
panied by payment of reasonable compensation under an old law 
authorizing the manufacture of a patented product by others if 
needed to protect the welfare of the country.152 These types of 
remedies may ameliorate excessive pricing for patented drugs, but 
do not resolve the deeper question raised by the Orphan Drug 
Act—the constitutional disability of Congress to create such a right 
of exclusivity to begin with.
A final option Congress should consider for all drugs and 
appliances in need of FDA approval in order to market the drugs 
or appliances as well as Orphan Drugs,153 is to reform the
151. See Desrosiers, supra note 2, at 144-45.
152. 28 U.S.C. § 1498; see also Desrosiers, supra note 2, at 145 (discussing federal 
condemnation of patent rights in drugs).
153. Regulation of the medical appliances market appears to be in need of a drastic 
overhaul. It has been essentially deregulated by the failure of the FDA to implement its
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economic basis upon which clinical testing is conducted—usually 
the most expensive factor in bringing safe and efficacious drugs 
and appliances to market. Congress should consider placing 
responsibility for conducting clinical testing in the hands of the 
FDA directly by legislation shifting responsibility for arranging 
clinical testing from manufacturers to the FDA. Financing the cost 
of this shift of responsibility could be done by imposing a manufac­
turing or wholesale tax on all prescription drugs and devices re­
quiring FDA approval in lieu of manufacturers including clinical 
testing costs in the price charged consumers for the drug or 
appliance. Revenues from the tax could then be used by the FDA 
to engage private concerns and individuals in conducting the 
clinical trials, under a regime of competitive bidding pursuant to 
FDA specifications. Such a change would not only remove the most 
significant entry barrier to research and development of drugs and 
appliances for all diseases and introduce competition into the 
process for securing clinical testing services for all drugs and 
appliances, but it would also give the FDA direct control over what 
have become significant abuses of the present system of private 
financing and responsibility for the honesty and integrity of 
clinical trials. Rather than reporting the results of clinical trials to 
the FDA through the filter of the applicant seeking approval for 
the drug or appliance, those engaged in clinical testing would be 
directly responsible to the FDA. Failure to fully disclose the 
results of clinical trials would be much less likely to happen and 
could be more directly controlled and taken account of by the FDA.
This last reform, coupled with tax and direct research 
incentives and the abolition of the unconstitutional seven year 
exclusivity right granted by the present Act, would appear to be 
the most direct solution to the present legal and practical difficul­
ties with the Act. Minimizing the practical economic barriers to 
orphan drug research, development and testing opens the way to 
competition defining the scope of private effort in developing drugs 
with a minimal market potential, as well as drugs with much 
larger markets potential. The public remedy is far more accurately
regulatory authority and the failure of Congress to appropriate sufficient funds to 
implement effective regulation. The results are a predictable increase in defective or 
dangerous devices on the market and serious injuries and death for patients subjected 
to their use. See Bruce Ingersoll, Health Risk: Amid Lax Regulation, Medical Devices 
Flood A Vulnerable Market, WALL ST. J., March 24, 1992, at A l.
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linked to the barriers creating dis-incentives for Orphan Drugs, 
instead of the present system of apparently vast reward for mini­
mal risk in too many instances.
Short of these kinds of reforms, the present grant of market 
exclusivity by the Orphan Drug Act is seriously vulnerable to 
constitutional challenge because: (1) The Act creates patent rights 
without conforming to the constitutional limitations upon the 
power of Congress to do so; and (2) Congress has exercised the 
commerce power to create patent rights in a manner not conform­
ing to the limitations of the Patent Clause when it adopted the Act 
and the FDA has been engaged in conferring what are patent 
rights in its administration of the Act. If Congress and the 
President truly care about developing safe and efficacious drugs to 
treat rare diseases, rather than protecting opportunities for 
unregulated monopoly profits of drug producers, they must find a 
constitutional method for stimulating research and development 
of orphan drugs before the courts are compelled to find the exclu­
sive marketing right of the Orphan Drug Act an unconstitutional 
exercise by the Congress and the FDA of the power conferred by 
the Patent Clause of the Constitution.
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